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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sarah M. Johnson appeals from the district court's order dismissing her
petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
In the early morning hours of September 2, 2003, Johnson shot and killed
her mother, Diane, and her father, Alan with a .264 rifle that belonged to Mel
Speegle who rented a guest house above the Johnson's garage but who was not
home at the time of the murders. (Trial Tr.1, Vol. IV, pp.2291-2309, pp.26852729.); State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970,972, 188 P.3d 912, 914 (2008). The
evidence proving Johnson was involved 2 in the murder of her parents was
overwhelming.
Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her
relationship with Bruno Santos, a nineteen-year-old illegal immigrant, who they
planned on reporting to law enforcement the day they were murdered. (Trial Tr.,
Vol. IV, p.2505, L.14 - p.2509, L.6; Vol. V, p.3337, Ls.7-18; p.3342, L.13 - p.3343,
L.6; p.3345, Ls.4-18; p.3357, L.15 - p.3359, L.6.)

Shortly after the murders,

Johnson fled to a neighbor's house, where she reported that both her parents had

1 The transcript from Johnson's criminal case was admitted as Exhibit 2 at the
post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
(Tr., p.4; Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) All
references to the transcript will be designated as "Trial Tr." along with the
relevant volume and page numbers.
2 The jury was instructed that Johnson could be found guilty of first-degree
murder regardless of whether she pulled the trigger or aided and abetted another
in the murders. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912.
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been shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1512, L.8-p.1519, L.5; p.1554, L.5-p.1555, L.25;
p.1583, L.18 - p.1586, L.10.) Although Johnson denied any involvement, she gave
several different accounts of what she allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what
she heard just prior to and after the murders. Johnson initially claimed she heard a
gunshot while she was in her room asleep, that she sat up in bed, then heard a
second shot, went to her parents' bedroom door, called for her mother, then fled the
house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1519, L.6 - p.1521, L.7; p.1558, Ls.3-19.) She stated
she had not seen anything, however.

(Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1521, Ls.3-7.)

The

second time she told the story, shortly thereafter, her report differed: she stated she
heard her father in the shower before the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1528, Ls.3-18.)
(See also Tr., Vol. VI, p.3696, L.6 - p.3701, L.15; p.3739, L.24 - p.3742, L.22
(another version of events told by Johnson).)
Upon being asked the first time by police what had happened, just a few
minutes later, she tried to reconcile these statements, stating that her father starting
the shower initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was re-awakened
again by the first shot. (TriaITr., Vol. III, p.1811, L.21-p.1813, L.6; p. 2099, L.17p.2103, L.21.) In this statement she also for the first time claimed she had opened
the door of the master bedroom before fleeing the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1850,
Ls.1-23.) She later told a friend that she had immediately fled the house upon
hearing the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3297, L.22 - p.3298, L.22.) She told this
friend's mother that, after hearing a shot and going to her parent's closed bedroom
door, she heard arguing, called out to her mother, and then fled the house. (Trial
Tr., Vol. VI, p.3529, L.10 - p.3530, L.15.) (See also Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2106, L.7-
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p.2112, L.23 (version of events Johnson gave police a few hours later).) Later that
day, Johnson told her brother that she woke up upon hearing the first shot, went to
her parents' closed door and called out for them, then heard the second shot and
fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pA545, L.16 - pA548, L.12.)
Johnson was interviewed again the day after the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2424, L.16 - p.2426, L.7.) She stated she woke up when she heard the shower
come on, and then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2426, L.8
- p.2428, LA.)

She got out of bed, went through her bathroom into the guest

bedroom, out into the hall, and to the door of the master bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol.
IV, p.2428, L.5 - p.2429, L.9.) She stated her bedroom door was either closed or
open only a crack. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2429, Ls.10-13.) In this interview, Johnson
claimed she heard the second shot while standing outside the master bedroom
door, but that the doors were open because her parents propped it open with a
pillow, and Johnson again stated she did not see or hear anything indicating a
struggle. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2429, L.14 - p.2432, L.1.) About 25 days after the
murders Sarah told another version of events. She told a relative that the first shot
woke her up; she heard a second shot, ran to her parents' bedroom, and saw blood
on the walls and floor. (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3684, L.22 - p.3690, L.12.)
Johnson's inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did, and heard
around the time of the murders were significant in relation to other evidence. For
example, several of the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted
her hair and appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep in
bed when the murders occurred. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1545, L.20 - p.1547, L.18;
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p.1559, L.14 - p.1560, L.11; p.1818, L.19 - p.1819, L.19; p.2520, L.15 - p.2521,
L.23.) Johnson's claim that her parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door had
been closed was also inconsistent with the presence of Diane's blood and brain
matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the hallway and part of Diane's skull
being in the hallway outside the master bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1619, L.20p.1620, L.10; p.1637, Ls.5-15; p.1655, L.2 - p.1657, L.9; p.1868, Ls.2-18; p.2019,
L.24 - p.2020, L.18; p.2020, L.24 - p.2022, L.3; p.2121, L.7 - p.2124, LA; Vol. V,
p.3122, L.11 - p.3123, L.20.) In addition, Diane's blood was found on the socks
Johnson was wearing the morning of the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1755, L.8 p.1759, L.8; Vol. V, p.3120, L.21 - p.3122, L.13; p.3423, Ls.8-14; p.3475, L.19p.3476, L.3.) Johnson also had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent
with a recent impact, such as shotgun recoil. 3 (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2248, L.3 p.2250, L.9; p.2317, L.6 - p.2318, L. 18.)
During the interview that took place the day after the murder, Johnson
admitted owning a pink bathrobe (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2436, Ls.7-18), admitted that a
right-handed leather glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother
and was usually in the car (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2036, L.1 - p.2037, L.6; Vol. IV,
p.2436, L.19 - p.2437, L.1; Vol. VI, p.3596, L.20 - p.3598, L.1), and claimed there
should not have been any bullets in her room (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2437, Ls.2-17).
However, unspent cartridges of the type used in the murders were found in her
bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2033, L.11 - p.2034, L.18.) On them was Diane's

Johnson claimed the bruises came from falling and hitting a table at Santos'
house when she stayed there two days before the murder. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2444, Ls.7-15.)
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blood. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3122, L.11 - p.3123, L.24.) In addition, the police found
the spent casings to rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and the master
bedroom (still in the rifle). (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1840, L.15 - p.1842, L.12; p.1843,
L.24 - p.944, L.15; p.1954, L.11 - p.1956, L.21; p.2051, L.3 - p.2053, L.8; Vol. V,
p.2912, L.6 - p.2954, L.16.) Also significant was evidence law enforcement found
in a trash can set out on the street for collection the morning of the murders: one
latex glove and one left-hand leather glove, which matched the glove found in
Johnson's bedroom, wrapped in the pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Trial
Tr., Vol. III, p.1672, L.16 - p.1673, L.17; p.1826, L.16 - p.1832, L.14; p.1893, L.19
- p.1902, L.17; Vol. VI, p.4566, L.16 - p.4568, L.25.) Inside the robe were paint
chips that matched paint on the shirt Johnson was wearing the morning of the
murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1755, L.8 - p.1758, L.6; Vol. VI, p.3574, L.1 - p.3587,
L.21.) Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present inside the latex glove (Trial
Tr., Vol. V, p. 3106, L.5 - p.2114, L.1), and the robe itself tested positive for blood
and DNA from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3114, L.2 - p.3117, L.11; p.3434, L.11 p.3459, L.3; p.3473, L.13 - p.3475, L.2), DNA possibly from Alan (Trial Tr., Vol. V,
p.3434, L.11 - p.3459, L.3), gun shot residue (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3229, L.15 p.3238, L.20), and tissue from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3446, L.19 - p.3448, L.18;
p.3454, L.16 - p.3455, L.23).

The blood on the robe was consistent with the

shooter having worn it, backwards, during the shooting. (Trial Tr., vol. VI, p.4194,
L.5-p.4211, L.21.)
, With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had
been hidden in a closet in the guesthouse used by Speegle. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
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p.2418, L.8 - p.2419, L.22; p.2702, L.3 - p.2706, L.1.) Speegle testified at trial
that (1) he kept the rifle in his closet along with three other guns (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2702, L.8 - p.2703, L.2); (2) the guns were not locked (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2703,
Ls.3-8); (3) he saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the
scope was still on the .264 rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2704, L.6 - p.2706, L.8); (4)
he had only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2706,
LS.17 -21); (5) he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2708, Ls.2-9); and
(6) he has no idea how many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a
friend helped him move into the guesthouse (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2707, Ls.11-22).
Speegle also testified that Johnson had access to his apartment, that
Johnson knew he would be gone the weekend before the murders, and that the
.264 rifle, as well as his other guns and ammunition, were in the closet when
Johnson cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2693, LS.17 -20, p.2694, L.25 - p.2696, L.6, p.2715, Ls.12-25.) In fact, Johnson
had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there several times, including the
days immediately preceding the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2037, L.7 - p.2038,
L.6; Vol. IV, p.2257, L.7 - p.2258, L.10; p.2437, L.18 - p.2439, L.23; p.2688, L.25p.2690, L.6; p.2715, L.12 - p.2716, L.6; Vol. V, p.3274, Ls.11-25; p.3285, L.6 p.3293, L.7; p.3335, L.14 - p.3336, L.22.)
When law enforcement was investigating the murders, they found the scope
from the murder weapon still in the guesthouse on the bed, and officers initially at
the scene observed footprints in the dew on the lawn going to and from the
Johnson home and the guesthouse, which was an apartment above the detached
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garage on the Johnson property. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1733, L.20 - p.1738, L.25,
p.1842, L.8 - p.1843, L.3; p.2056, L.2 - p.2057, L.22; Vol. IV, p.2706, Ls.2-16,
p.2685, L.12 - p.2686, L.25.)

A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from the

guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2038, L.7 p.2040, L.10.) A nine-millimeter handgun matching the magazine was in a gun
safe in the guesthouse (Trial Tr., Vol. III, L.7 - p.2062, L.12), and a .22 rifle from the
guesthouse closet was also found in the garage (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1728, L.20 p.1731, L.20; p.2047, L.18 - p.2050, L.18; Vol. IV, p.2708, L.13 - p.2709, L.14).
Johnson had asked her parents for a key to the family's gun safe two days before
the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3336, Ls.10-22.)
The state charged Johnson with, and a jury convicted her of two counts of
first-degree murder and a firearm enhancement. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 972, 188
P.3d at 914. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's convictions.

Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings
Johnson pursued post-conviction relief.

Johnson, through counsel,

ultimately filed a "Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' raising
numerous claims. (R., Vol. 3, pp.801-825.) Included among Johnson's claims
c

were allegations that (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from
Robert Kerchusky, the defense's fingerprint expert, that the unidentified
fingerprints found on the scope that was removed from the murder weapon and
an insert from a box of ammunition for the murder weapon were "fresh" (R., Vol.
3, pp.815-817), and (2) that newly discovered evidence entitled Johnson to a
new trial. (R., Vol. 3, pp.823-824.) The newly discovered evidence claim was
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based on the fact that, at the time of Johnson's trial, there were unidentified
prints on the murder weapon and an insert from the ammunition box. A standard
Automated Fingerprint Identification System check of previously unidentified
prints revealed a match between those prints and prints provided by Christopher
Hill in connection with an arrest for driving under the influence. (Tr., p.652, LS.221; p.654, Ls.2-22; see also p.659, Ls.11-14.)
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal (R, Vol. 3, pp.835-836; R,
Vol.4, pp.837-898), which was granted in part, and denied in part (R, Vol. 6,
pp.1413-1414, 1424-1445-1450).4 The court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on six claims including Johnson's claims regarding counsel's alleged failure to
inquire about the "freshness" of the unidentified prints and the newly discovered
evidence claim. (R, Vol. 6, pp.1449-1450.)
Both Speegle and Hill testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
(Tr., pp.699-724, 726-739.) Speegle testified that he moved into the guest house
on the Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (Tr., p.699, Ls.10-15.)

Hill

helped Speegle move from his "ranch house" into the Johnson guest house. (Tr.,
p.700, Ls.18-20, p.703, Ls.20-23.) Hill was a "good friend" of Speegle's and had
been a caretaker at Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Speegle's
.264 rifle. (Tr., p.704, Ls.1-4, 11-13, p.724, Ls.10-20.) To Speegle's knowledge,
however, Hill did not have access to the Johnson guest house. (Tr., p.704, LS.810.)

4 Johnson also withdrew some of her claims and conceded the state was entitled
to summary dismissal on other claims. (R, Vol. 6, pp.1413, 1445-1446.)
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Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Speegle's ranch and that he
helped Speegle move "a few things" into the Johnson guest house. (Tr., p.726,
Ls.14-17, p.727, Ls.5-12.) Hill also confirmed that he did not have access to the
guest house. (Tr., p.727, Ls.13-16.) Hill specifically denied any involvement in
the murders of Alan and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the murders
until about one week after they occurred because he had been camping. (Tr.,
p.728, Ls.5-20.) In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other
than having possibly left them when he helped Mr. Speegle move, Hill testified
that, during the springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Speegle's ranch,
he "took it out, tried to sight it," and shot it "six or seven times" using Speegle's
ammunition. (Tr., p.728, L.21 - p.729, L.7; see also p.729, L.24 - p.731, L.21.)
After the evidentiary hearing, and submission of post-trial briefing, the
district court denied relief on the remainder of Johnson's claims.
pp.1724-1927 5 .)

(R., Vol. 7,

Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1931-

1933.)

For the Court's convenience, a copy of the district court's lengthy, thorough,
and well-reasoned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto
as Appendix A.
5
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ISSUES

Contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)(4). Johnson provides no statement of the issues
on appeal.

Based on Johnson's arguments, the state phrases the issues on

appeal as:
1.
Has Johnson failed to establish the district court erred in denying relief on
her claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective in presenting fingerprint
evidence?
2.
Has Johnson failed to establish the district court erred in denying her
motion for a new trial based upon the newly discovered fingerprint evidence
since such evidence was not material and would not likely produce an acquittal?

10

ARGUMENT
I.
Johnson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Relief On
Her Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To The Presentation Of
Fingerprint Evidence

A.

Introduction
Johnson contends the district court erred in denying relief on her claim

that counsel was ineffective in relation to the presentation of fingerprint evidence
at trial. (Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), pp.31-47.) A review of
the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing and at trial supports the
district court's conclusion that Johnson was not entitled to relief on this claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of

law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based.
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141
(1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof
is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,
965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v.
State, 103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982).
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C.

Johnson Has Failed To Establish She Met Her Burden Of Proving Counsel
Was Ineffective In Presenting Fingerprint Evidence At Trial
Johnson contends her trial attorney's "performance was deficient for failing

to elicit testimony from Bob Kerchusky that the prints found on the murder
weapon, and its scope and ammunition were fresh prints and were not deposited
at the time the State argued at trial" and that "[h]is failure to do so prejudiced"
her. (Appellant's Brief, p.31.) The district court correctly concluded Johnson is
not entitled to relief on this claim
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

An attorney's

performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson
v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174,1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132
Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme
Court has recently reiterated:
Surmounting Stricklands high bar is never an easy task. An
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and
12

so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care,
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations
omitted).
A review of the applicable law, the record on appeal, and the underlying
criminal record, supports the district court's conclusion that Johnson failed to
meet her burden of proving she was entitled to post-conviction relief on her claim
that counsel was ineffective in examining the defense's fingerprint expert at trial.
At trial, Tina Walthall, a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho State Police,
testified that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos, Alan
Johnson, Diane Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (a cleaning lady), Russell
Nuxoll (Sylten's boyfriend), and Robin Lehat (Sylten's employer). (Trial Tr., Vol.
V, p.3009, Ls.16-20.) Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints
lifted from the crime scene. 6
comparisons,

(Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3018, Ls.2-5.)

After those

certain fingerprints taken from the crime scene remained

unidentified, including fingerprints found on the stock of the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V,
p.3027, L.20 - p.3028, L.22), the scope from the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3042,
L.22 - p.3044, L.2), and two boxes of .264 shells (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3049, L.8 p.3052, L.3). A search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System prior to
trial using three of the unidentified prints also revealed no matches to any of the
unidentified fingerprints.

(Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3045, L.1 - p.3046, L.10, p.3053,

Ls. 5-11, p. 3066, Ls. 1-13.)
None of the fingerprints taken from the crime scene matched Santos or Sylten.
(Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3020, Ls.15-24.)
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Walthall also repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to
determine when it was left (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3028, Ls.13-17, p.3044, Ls.22-25,
p.3052, Ls.22-25, p.3058, L.19 - p.3062, L.11, p.3073, Ls.5-15.)
specifically stated:

Walthall

(1) "many, many years can pass and you might still find

usable fingerprints on" paper or cardboard (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3060, Ls.10-11);
(2) she has discovered prints off of nonporous surfaces more than a year later
(Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061, LsA-5); (3) one would expect to find fingerprints more
than a year old if nothing happened between "when they were deposited and
when [they were] processed" (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061, Ls.20-25); and (4) "it is
probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a year, providing there
has been nothing to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which is true even on
a nonporous surface (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3062, Ls.3-6).
Johnson called Robert Kerchusky at trial to rebut Walthall's testimony.
(See generally Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.5044-5132.) With respect to the length of
time a fingerprint will remain on a gun, Kerchusky testified: "Well, we can't be
sure how long they're going to last. The only thing, as far as a gun is concerned,
pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm
concerned." (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5070, Ls.9-12; see also Tr., Vol. V, p.5128,
L.22 - p.5129, L.1.) Kerchusky, however, acknowledged that aging offingerprints
on nonporous surfaces is a controversial subject because "there's so many
variables as far as weather, where it's located. I mean there's so many things
that come into it, there's no way in the world anybody could write any article on
it."

(Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5107, Ls.3-6.)
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Kerchusky also acknowledged that

fingerprints on porous surfaces can last for years and that there are some "rare"
instances where a latent print that was over a year old could be found on a
nonporous surface.

(Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5130, Ls.8-16.)

Kerchusky further

testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, he "still
would have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not." (Trial Tr., Vol.
VII, p.5108, Ls.1-6.)
While trial counsel may not have used the word "fresh" in his examination
of Kerchusky, the issue regarding the "freshness" of the unidentified prints was
clearly covered.

The type of language counsel uses in asking questions is

certainly well within counsel's decision-making authority.

The district court

correctly concluded as much. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1916-1917.)
Johnson

claims

the district court erred

in finding

trial counsel's

performance regarding his examination of Kerchusky objectively reasonable,
arguing the district court's conclusion is not supported by the record because,
she asserts, counsel "did not even recall having a discussion about freshness"
and that "[a]1I he knew was that 'it would be very unlikely that [the prints] would
last beyond a year.'"

(Appellant's Brief, p.46.) It is Johnson's argument that is

not supported by the record.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, trial

counsel testified:
Q:
And do you recall Mr. Kerchusky telling you that, in his
opinion, the latent but unidentified prints on the -- on the rifle and on
the scope and on the inserts and on the ammunition were fresh
prints?
A:

I recall that -- well, you'd have to define "fresh prints."
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Q:
You don't recall Mr. Kerchusky's lesson about what fresh
prints are?

A:
Well, Mr. Kerchusky and I discussed how long fingerprints
would stay in existence; and my recollection was that they would -it would be very unlikely that they would last as much as a year,
because a fingerprint is, unless it's some kind of, been etched into
some metal as a result of corrosive bodily fluids, is -- are bodily
fluids that will eventually evaporate. And my recollection was that it
would be very unlikely that they would last beyond a year.
Q:
And for example, someone saying that they had touched one
of those objects a year or more before was just not possible,
according to Mr. Kerchusky's opinion; correct?

A:
Very, very unlikely.
I don't think he said it would be
impossible but that it would be very unlikely that a fingerprint would
last longer than a year. And to the extent that's what you mean by
fresh, less than a year old, yeah, I do recall that.
Q:
And do you recall that Mr. Kerchusky shared with you some
of his, the basis of his opinion, that is, that there are certain
environmental conditions which may impact whether a print could
last on an object for over a year or whether an object that had been
subjected to certain environmental conditions may lose latent prints
during a shorter period of time if subjected to those conditions? Do
you remember that?

A:

Yeah, in general I remember that.

(Tr., pAD?, L.12 - pA09, L.2 (bold omitted).)
Contrary to Johnson's claim, trial counsel

remembered discussing

Kerchusky's position with him and counsel, in fact, elicited testimony from
Kerchusky at trial that the unidentified prints could not be more than a year old
or, in other words, that the prints were what Kerchusky would call "fresh."
Johnson's fixation on using the word "fresh" and her implied insistence that the
word must be used in order to communicate the idea that the prints were
deposited recently does not demonstrate ignorance by trial counsel in either his
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trial performance or his recollection of conversations he had with Kerchusky prior
to trial.
Even if trial counsel should have used the word "fresh" in his questioning
of Kerchusky, Johnson cannot establish she was prejudiced by counsel's failure
to do so. Trial counsel clearly highlighted for the jury the theory that whoever left
the unidentified fingerprints on the gun and ammunition was the person who
murdered Alan and Diane.

(Supplemental Trial Tr., p.272, Ls.7-25.)

Also

referring to the claims as being "fresh" would not have made a difference in the
jury's evaluation of Johnson's guilt, particularly in light of the overwhelming
evidence against Johnson, which is discussed in further detail in Section II.B.,

Johnson has failed to establish error in the district court's conclusion that
she is not entitled to relief on her claim that counsel was ineffective in eliciting
testimony from the defense's fingerprint expert.

II.
Johnson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Relief On
Her Newly Discovered Evidence Claim

A.

Introduction
Johnson argues the district court erred in denying relief on her newly

discovered evidence claim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.47-65.) Johnson is incorrect.
While the post-trial identification of Hill's fingerprints as a match to the previously
unidentified prints on the rifle, scope and ammunition inserts constitutes newly
discovered evidence that could not have been found through the exercise of
diligence, the evidence is not material and would not likely produce an acquittal.
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The record supports the district court's conclusion that Johnson is not entitled to
a new trial on this basis.

B.

The Identification Of Hill's Fingerprints Is Not Material And Would Not
Likely Produce An Acquittal
In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho

Supreme Court articulated a four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be
entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires
a defendant to show that the evidence offered (1) is "newly discovered and was
unknown to the defendant at the time of trial"; (2) is material, not merely
cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) could
not have been discovered through the exercise of diligence on the part of the
defendant.

kL

at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. In announcing this four-part test, the

Court cited Professor Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure and
specifically noted his comment, "after a man has had his day in court, and has
been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second triaL"
(citation omitted).

kL

The district court, reciting these standards, concluded that

although the identification of Hill's prints qualified as newly discovered evidence
that was unknown to Johnson prior to trial through no fault of her own, she is not
entitled to a new trial because the evidence is not material and not likely to
produce an acquittal on retrial.

(R., Vol. 7, pp.1919-1920.)

In reaching this

conclusion, the court noted:
107. At trial, the evidence of fingerprints on the murder
weapon, the scope, the box and elsewhere was presented and
dealt with extensively. (TT 2944:10-3077:25; 5045:15-5132:15;
5808:1-5843:4; 5846:16-5858:17.)
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108. The jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were
on the scope, gun, some of the shells, and the box containing the
shells. (TT 3077:1-17). Thus, it was established at trial that
Johnson had left no fingerprints on those items; if any of the prints
on those items belonged to the "real killer," then the killer was not
Johnson and was some unidentified person.
109. [Trial counsel] utilized this fingerprint information and
argued it to the jury, to no avail. (See, e.g., Supplemental Appeal
Transcript, 270:11-272:25) ([Trial counsel's] closing argument that
the fingerprints on the rifle and scope had not been there very long
- implying that the "real killer" was unidentified).
110. The jury was aware of the phantom prints, and they
still convicted Johnson of both counts of first degree murder; thus,
telling a new jury the name of the owner of those phantom prints
will not likely produce an acquittal.
111. Speegle and Hill both testified as to how, when and
where Hill had touched the rifle. The fact that this information is
now known makes the fingerprint testimony even less valuable than
it was at the time of the trial, when the defense argued that a
nameless third party handled the gun, the shells and removed the
scope.
112. The court recognizes that Mr. Kerchusky testified in a
contradictory manner to this conclusion; he is convinced of his
theory of the case, as much a the state's expert, Ms. Walthall is
convinced that you cannot age fingerprints.
113. The court's task it to evaluate both witnesses'
testimony in light of the entire record before the court. In doing so,
the court chooses not to accept Kerchusky's hypothesis.
114. This court, as fact-finder, is not bound to accept the
testimony of any expert witness. [Citations omitted.]
115. The court simply cannot accept the theory that Hill
was the unknown killer in this case. Hill testified credibly that he
was camping on East Magic Road at the time of the murders. He
had no access to the guest house or to the Johnson home; he has
no knowledge of the inner workings of the Johnson home, i.e.,
where knives were hidden, where Sarah's robe was kept, or where
the key to the gun safe was located (to retrieve the 9mm
magazine). The totality of the circumstances simply does not
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support Kerchusky's theory that Hill was the last person to touch
the scope, the gun, or the ammunition and this court does not'
accept that theory.
116. The court also does not find it surpnslng that
Johnson's fingerprints were not on the weapon, the scope, or any
of the ammunition or packaging, given that a leather glove was
found in her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was
wrapped in Johnson's robe ready for trash pickup, along with a
latex glove containing Johnson's DNA.
117. Moreover, the trial jury was also instructed on the
theory of aiding and abetting murder. Use of such instruction was
affirmed on appeal. [Citation omitted.]
118. While the state did not rely upon that "theory of
liability" in proving its case, the jury was free to consider that theory
because it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been
the actual shooter. [Citation omitted.]
119. Nothing presented to this court during the postconviction evidentiary hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she
were not the actual shooter, was not complicit as an aider and
abettor.
120. It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of
the murders. There was no forced entry in this case, either to the
Johnson home or the guesthouse; Johnson's bedroom contained
.264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a right-handed
leather glove matching the left one wrapped in Johnson's robe in
the garbage; both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the
family vehicle; the knives found in the guest bedroom and at the
foot of the Johnsons' bed were located where an intruder or
stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to
the guesthouse; Johnson was angry with her parents because they
disapproved of her relationship with Santos; and Johnson gave
numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was doing
when her parents were shot.
(R., Vol. 7, pp.1921-1924.)
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The court also referenced the trial judge's view of the evidence, quoting
the Honorable Barry Wood's statements?:
In think it's really interesting that the brother-in-law, the man
who had gotten married there the week before, two weeks before,
whatever it was, that spent, he testified, four or five days in that
very upstairs apartment in the guest house, and never knew the
gun was there, never saw it. Used the closet and didn't even know
the gun was there. Didn't know the bullets were there.
[T]o suggest to a reasonable jury such things that somebody
off of the street could come and find that gun in the guest house,
find those bullets in the guest house, know when the parents were
going to be there; find the knives in the kitchen that are hidden, the
one knife that's hidden behind the microwave or bread box,
whatever it was, in the dark no less; go out past the family dog that
the evidence was would bark, and the dog didn't bark.
Take the same route that Sarah Johnson told the police she
took out of the house, past the trash can where the robe is found.
Get her bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not
awaken her or bother her.
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the
parents' bedroom d06r and her bedroom door. Do all of this in the
dark and not disturb the parents just defies common sense.
I think a reasonable jury could clearly find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here. The jury
heard all of the evidence about the robe.
(R., Vol. 7, p.1924 (quoting Supplemental Appeal Tr., 449: 1-450:4).)

Johnson claims the district court's conclusion regarding the materiality and
likely to produce an acquittal prongs of the Drapeau test are erroneous for a
variety of reasons. All of Johnson's argument fail.
Johnson first contends the evidence is material, arguing "Hill's fresh
fingerprints were on the gun and ammunition, that he was the one who took off

As a result of Judge Wood's retirement, the Honorable Richard Bevan presided
over much of Johnson's post-conviction case.

7
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the scope shortly before the murders, and he was the last person to touch the
weapon." (Appellant's Brief, p.52.) This argument is predicated on Johnson's
theory being true in the first instance.

If Johnson's allegations regarding Hill

were, in fact, true, then her claim of materiality may have merit. Because the
district court expressly rejected the factual assertions underlying Johnson's
materiality claim (R., Vol. 7, p.1863), her argument necessarily fails.
Johnson next attacks the district court's conclusion that the identification
of Hill's prints would not likely produce an acquittal, asserting error in a number of
the reasons the court cited in support of its conclusion. These arguments also
fail.
Johnson first protests that identification of Hill's prints would likely produce
an acquittal because, she argues, "unidentified prints are profoundly different
from identified prints." (Appellant's Brief, p.53.) While identifying a fingerprint
may, in some instances, raise doubt as to a person's involvement in a crime, it
does not, and did not, in Johnson's case. The jury was clearly aware that there
were fingerprints left on the murder weapon and the ammunition insert that were
not attributable to Johnson and the jury convicted her nonetheless.

Matching

those prints to Christopher Hill only serves to strengthen the state's case against
Johnson because, as with Mel Speegle, identification of those prints excluded
another individual as a potential suspect. Even Kerchusky acknowledged at the
evidentiary hearing that fingerprints alone are not evidence of guilt; rather, prints
are often obtained, as they were in this case, for the purpose of eliminating
individuals as suspects. (Tr., pp.632-635.)
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Johnson, of course, takes a quite different view of Hill as a suspect,
asserting for the first time on appeal that Sylten, who helped clean the Johnson
residence on one occasion, basically conspired with Hill to murder the Johnsons.
(Appellant's Brief, p.55.) This Court should decline to consider this argument
because it was never presented to the district court.
In her post-trial briefing, Johnson argued that the Hill evidence would likely
produce an acquittal because, according to her, "had the jury also known the
prints were those of a homeless man, with possible motive of financial gain,
access to the scene of the crime, no alibi, and whose explanation of how his
prints got on the tools of murder was highly unlikely, reasonable doubt would
have prevented conviction." (R., Vol. 7, p.1793.) Now Johnson argues, for the
first time, some speculative nefarious connection between Hill and Sylten that
allowed Hill, with Sylten's assistance, to murder the Johnsons. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.55-56.) Because this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal, the
state submits this Court should decline to consider it. See Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50,56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) ("Idaho Code section 19-4903 mandates
that the application for post-conviction relief 'specifically set forth the grounds
upon which the application is based. . .. All grounds for relief ... must be raised
in [the defendant's] original, supplemental, or amended application.' I.C. § 194908.") (emphasis added). It is equally well-settled that claims not preserved for
appellate review will not be considered. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) ("Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error
not preserved for appeal through an objection at trial. This limitation on appellate-
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court authority serves to induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which
gives the trial court the opportunity to consider and resolve them." (Citations,
quotations, and brackets omitted.)).
Even if this Court considers Johnson's Hill-Syiten conspiracy theory, the
argument fails because it is unsupported by any evidence, is based on factual
statements that are contradicted by the record, and is generally so farfetched that
the Court can easily conclude, as the district court would have had Johnson
presented the argument to it, that the theory would not produce an acquittal.
Although Johnson speculates that Hill and Sylten may have had a
"connection" because Hill was "camping by himself on the Magic Reservoir on
the day the Johnsons were killed" and Sylten "had also been living at the
Reservoir" (Appellant's Brief, p.55), Johnson presented no actual evidence of any
"connection" between Hill and Sylten. Indeed, Johnson never asked Hill about
his relationship, if any, with Sylten (see generally Tr., pp.972-975), nor did she
call Sylten as a witness at the hearing in an effort to establish any sort of
relationship between Sylten and HilLa

The lack of any evidence of this

speculative "connection" is sufficient to reject Johnson's argument that it would
be likely to produce an acquittal. Even if that were not the case, the evidence
that actually exists reveals just how specious the argument is.
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Hill testified that when the
Johnsons were murdered on September 2, 2003, he was "camping out on East
Magic Road."

(Tr., p.965, Ls.5-17.)

Sylten testified at Johnson's trial on

a In fact, Johnson did not call Hill as a witness either; Hill was the state's witness
at the post-conviction hearing.
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February 15, 2005. (See Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2663.) At that time, Sylten had been
living at her brother's house in Twin Falls for three weeks.
p.2831, Ls.9-19.)

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV,

Prior to that, Sylten was living in a house at West Magic

Reservoir. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2831, L.22 - p.2832, L.6.) Sylten lived there from
June 2004 until she moved to her brother's house in Twin Falls in January 2005.
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2832, Ls.7-12.)

Thus, Johnson's claimed "connection"

between Hill and Sylten is based on the fact that Johnson and Sylten, at two
entirely different points in time, were in a place with the name "Magic" in it.
In addition to Johnson's farfetched theory of a murderous connection
between Hill and Sylten, Johnson's assertions that Hill "knew where to find the
guns and had a connection to the Johnson house" (Appellant's Brief, p.55) and
that Sylten "knew the Johnson house intimately having just cleaned it"
(Appellant's Brief, p.56), are not supported by the record.
Hill testified that he "might have" handled the rifle again when Speegle
move into the guest house behind the Johnson residence, but there was no
evidence that he moved the guns into the guest house, much less that he knew
where in that house Speegle kept the guns.

(Tr., p.963, L.24 - p.964, L.12;

p.967, Ls.18-21; p.940, L.25 - p.941, L.3; p.949, L.11 P .950, L.1.) Regardless,
Hill did not have access to the Johnson guest house where Speegle was staying.
(Tr., p.964, Ls.13-16.)
Sylten's alleged "intimate" knowledge of the Johnson's house could only
be based on the one time she spent three to four hours cleaning it with Robin
Lehat on August 26, 2003, the Wednesday before Labor Day weekend. (Trial
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Tr., Vol. IV, p.2805, L.24 - p.2806, L.9; p.2807, Ls.3-4; Vol. VI, p.3760, L.23 p.3761, L.1.) Even then, Sylten's knowledge would be limited to the portions she
cleaned, which included the master bedroom and bathroom and Johnson's
bedroom and bathroom, the living room, the pictures, and the half bath. (Trial
Tr., Vol. IV, p.2808, L.22 - p.2809, L.8.) Robin Lehat "did the rest." (Trial Tr.,
Vol. IV, p.2809, Ls.7-8.) Sylten did not clean in the garage, the vehicles in the
garage, or any other structure on the property. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2809, Ls.1222.) In fact, Sylten never went into the garage and she was unaware there was a
guest home behind the main residence. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2809, Ls.18-19, 2325; Vol. VI, p.3761, Ls.6-8.)
Johnson also suggests that Sylten had a motive to murder the Johnsons
to "stop them from making allegations that could result in revocation of her newly
minted parole."

(Appellant's Brief, p.56.)

The allegations to which Johnson

refers relate to some makeup that was missing from the Johnson residence after
Sylten and Lehat cleaned it.

(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2810, Ls.7-21.)

There is,

however, no evidence that Sylten's parole status was in jeopardy, much less that
she would conspire to commit murder and risk going to prison for the rest of her
life, or perhaps even be subject to the death penalty, in order to avoid such a
speculative revocation.

Further, both Sylten and Lehat denied there was any

animosity between Sylten and the Johnsons; in fact, Sylten testified she never
even met Diane Johnson. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2815, L.14 - p.2817, L.1; see also
Vol. VI, p.3760, Ls.3-5.) And Lehat testified Diane was not interested in filing
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criminal charges and did not want anyone fired, but was "actually really, really
nice about it." (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3763, Ls.18-22; p.3782, Ls.12-15.)
Johnson next argues that the identification of Hill's prints "exonerates" her
"because it shows she was not the one who fired the weapon that morning and
shows she was not an accomplice as there is no evidence that she and Hill even
knew each other much less had a reason to act in concert." (Appellant's Brief,
p.58.) The identification of Hill's prints, however, does nothing to show Johnson
"was not the one who fired the weapon that morning" anymore than the existence
of unidentified prints or Speegle's prints would show such a thing. Further, it is
ironic that Johnson would argue exoneration as an accomplice based on the lack
of any "evidence that she and Hill even knew each other much less had a reason
to act in concert" given her willingness to claim a conspiracy between Hill and
Sylten based on even less "evidence".
Johnson also attacks a number of other evidentiary points highlighted by
the district court in concluding the identification of Hill's prints would not likely
produce an acquittal.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.60-64.)

For example, Johnson

argues "the presence of the gloves in [her] room and the garbage can outside is
more consistent with an intent by the real killer to divert suspicion to [her] than
some theory that [she] carefully plotted and planned the murders and then left
gloves not even used in her room and the trash where they were quickly
discovered by the police." (Appellant's Brief, p.61.) The readily apparent flaw in
Johnson's argument is the idea that if she were the "real killer," she would not
have been so careless as to leave items in the trash where they could be
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discovered, but another "real killer," i.e., Hill, would be so careless as to leave his
fingerprints on the murder weapon and get gloves and wear a pink bathrobe,
neither of which were likely to fit him,9 as props to "divert suspicion" to Johnson.
Not only that, but, by Johnson's theory, Hill was able to set up such an elaborate
scene inside the Johnson residence, including inside Johnson's own bedroom, all
without waking either Johnson or her parents. The trial judge concluded this did
not make sense as did the judge who presided over the post-conviction hearing.

(R, Vol. 7, p.1926.) These findings of fact are well-supported.
Johnson also complains that the district court applied the incorrect legal
standard because, she asserts, it was not within the court's purview to accept or
reject Kerchusky's theory, but the court was only to "evaluate how the jury would
see the new evidence within the context of the trial and then determine whether
or not it would have raised a reasonable doubt as to [Johnson's] guilt."
(Appellant's Brief, p.59.)

Regardless of how Johnson interprets the district

court's language, it is clear from the entirety of the court's order denying relief
that the court was well aware of the controlling legal standards and applied them
correctly to the evidence presented. (See generally R, Vol. 7, pp.1919-1927.)
The court specifically noted it had "spent significant hours reviewing the 1000's of
pages of transcript from trial," "listened to testimony during the post-conviction
hearing," "reviewed the parties' post-hearing briefing," and "reviewed all of this
evidence against the legal standards set forth herein."

(R, Vol. 7, p.1926.)

9 Hill testified that he is six feet tall and weighs 200 pounds (Tr., p.963, Ls.9-13.)
Johnson, on the other hand, was a sixteen-year-old girl at the time of the
murders.
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Based on that review, the court concluded, as did the trial judge, that the
evidence against Johnson is "overwhelming." (R., Vol. 7, p.1926.) The court,
therefore, concluded "the evidence identifying Mr. Hill's fingerprints is insufficient
to make such evidence material, or likely to produce an acquittal.

As such,

Johnson's claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence [was]
DENIED."

(R., pp.1926-1927 (capitalization original).)

Johnson has failed to

establish this conclusion was erroneous.
Because Johnson has failed to establish any error in relation to the
dismissal of her post-conviction petition, she is not entitled to any relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Johnson's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 2 nd day of July, 2012.

De
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Jo/ynn Drage, Clelfc District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
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)
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)
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)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2006-324

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

---------------------------)

Christopher P. Simms, Hailey, Idaho, for Petitioner, Sarah Johnson
Jessica Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Boise, Idaho, for Respondent, state of Idaho

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-1

('

THIS MATTER came before the court for evidentiary hearing beginning
Tuesday, December 7, 2010. The petitioner Sarah Johnson was present throughout the
hearing, represented by her counsel, Christopher P. Simms. The respondent, state of
Idaho was represented by Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputies
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorneys for the state of Idaho.
The hearing was conducted over four days, concluding December 10, 2010. The
parties requested to submit closing arguments in writing, which were received by the
court and reviewed as part of this court's fact-finding process. The matter was taken
under advisement on March 16, 2011, and the court hereby enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a).
BACKGROUND

This case presents iID application for post-conviction relief brought by the
petitioner, Sarah Johnson (Johnson) in her Second Amended Petition, filed January 11,
2010. This court previously ruled on dispositive motions in this case on or about July
19 and December 2,2010. Johnson also voluntarily dismissed certain claims prior to
h"ial. At this juncture the following seven claims remain for resolution by this court:
1.

Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall

lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case,
chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including
trial, all of which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, in a
manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict;
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 2

(

2.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for ff,illing to request a

continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after
learning a comforter had not been collected as evidence;
3.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately

investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on
blood splatter opinion evidence;
4.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately

cross-examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos
Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson;
5.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present

evidence of an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross
Kirtley, which recording allegedly proved the theory that police focused
on Petitioner Sarah Johnson, to the exclusion of all other possible suspects
and theories, because she was the easiest target;
6.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire

whether certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh"; and

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 3

\~

("

7.

Newly

discovered

evidence

relating

to

the

recent

identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously
unidentified latent fingerprints.
While the state has not delineated two of these issues specifically in its proposed
findingp herein, it has acknowledged all seven of these claims in its arguments. This
court will ther~fore discuss the issues as set forth above and, excepting the cumulative
error issue, in the order presented by Johnson in her post-hearing memoranda.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ON POST CONVICTION

1.

Trial counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal after Johnson was

sentenced.
2.

On or about April 19, 2006, Johnson filed her initial Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief, from which she was granted relief to pursue a direct appeal, with the
remaining post-conviction issues stayed.
3.

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's conviction on or about June

26,2008. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008).
4.

On or about August 15, 2008, this court lifted the previously entered stay

and thereafter granted leave for Johnson to file a First Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief.
5.

On or about December 28,2009, this court granted Johnson leave to file a

Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
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6.

On or about February 8, 2010, Johnson and the state of Idaho filed cross

motions for summary disposition.
7.

The motions were heard on April 20, 2010. This court ruled from the

bench, dismissing some of Johnson's claims. The court took further issues under
advisement and issued a memorandum decision and order on May 20, 2010, regarding
those claims. The
8.

court~s

order concerning those claims was entered on July 19,2010.

The state filed a motion for reconsideration as to two issues. This court

granted relief in part on December 2,2010, dismissing Johnson's claim regarding
appellate counsel.
9.

On December 6,2010, Johnson filed a memorandum dismissing an

additional claim.
10.

This court conducted an evidentiary hearing/trial (hereinafter referred to

as evidentiary) from December 7 through December 10,2010.
11.

This court heard from the following witnesses during the evidentiary:

Patrick Dunn; Mark Rader; Raul Comelas; Stuart Robinson; Bob Pangburn; Jerry Walt
Femling; Jane Lopez; Steve Harkins; Consuelo Cedeno; Bruno Santos; Maria Eguren;
Robert Kerchusky; Tina Walthall; Mel Speegle; and Christopher Kevin Hill.
12.

These witnesses varied in their abilities to remember and relate facts of

consequence in this case. The court notes its particular ability to observe each witness'
demeanor and credibility in making the factual findings set forth herein.
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13.

Counsel filed post-hearing briefing on or about February 14, 201t and

again on or about February 28, 2011. The court took this matter under advisement as of
March 16, 2011.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The following Findings of Fact are based upon this court's review of the

evidence admitted at the trial of this cause, along with the court's unique opportunity to
view and observe each witness who testified, thereby making observations regarding
each witness' demeanor, credibility and reliability.l
2.

On the morning of September 2, 2003, Alan and Diane Johnson were

found shot to death in their home, where they lived with their daughter Sarah Gohnson)

(See Exhibit 2 (hereinafter Trial Transcript (TT) 1645:9-1663:6; 1887:1-1889:9); see also
Post- Conviction Evidentiary Hearing (PCH) Exhibit 12).
3.

Early on the morning of September 2, a neighbor of the Johnsons, Kim

Richards, was awakened by her daughter Rachel, indicating that she heard screaming.
Mrs. Richards got out of bed and ran to the front door" and I'turned on the front porch
1/

light and unlocked and opened the front door/' when she saw Johnson running down
their driveway toward their house. (TT 1518:2-11).

J The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are all matters solely within the province of this court. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 4483675, 2 (Idaho
App. 2010) (citing Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988)); see also I.R.C.P 52(a).
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4.

Mrs. Richards and Rachel attempted to find out what was happening.

Johnson was screaming and breathlng heavily, stating that someone had shot both of
her parents. (TT 1518:18-1519:23).
5.

Immediately before coming to the Richards' home Johnson had been to

the homes of two neighbors who did not answer the door when Johnson knocked. (TT
1537:11-15; 1518:8-11).
6.

Although Johnson denied any involvement in the shooting, she gave

several different accounts of what she allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what she
heard just prior to and after the murders.
7.

Johnson initially claimed she heard a gunshot while she was in her room

asleep, that she sat up in bed, then heard a second shot, went to her parents' bedroom
door, called for her mother, then fled the house. (TT 1519:6-1521:7; 1558:3-19). Johnson
initially stated she had not seen anything before leaving the home. (Id., 1521:3-7).
8.

'The second time Johnson told the story, a short time later, her report

differed: she stated she was awakened by the sound of her father in the shower before
she heard any shots. (TT 1528:3-18).
9.

Johnson told yet another version of events a short time later. (TT 3696:6-

3701:15; 3739:24-3742:22).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ~ 7

(r;

10.

(I

Upon being asked the first time by the police what had happened, just a

few minutes later, Johnson attempted to reconcile her statements, stating that her
father's starting the shower initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was
re-awakened again by the first shot. (IT 1811:21 - 1813:6; 2099:17 - 2103:21).
11.

In this statement, Johnson also claimed for the first time she had opened

the door of the master bedroom before fleeing the house. (TI 1850:1-23).
12.

Johnson later told a friend that she had immediately fled the house upon

hearing the shots. (IT 3297:22 - 3298:22). She told this friend's mother that, after
hearing a shot and going to her parent's closed bedroom door, she heard arguing, called
out to her mother, and then fled the house. (Id., 3529:10 - 3530:15).
13.

Johnson was interviewed approximately three hours later by Detective

Steve Harkins of the Blaine County Sheriff's Office. Detective Harkins gave Johnson her

Miranda warnings. (TT 2107:15-23). Johnson then gave additional details during this
interview. (See generally id., 2106-2111).
14.

Later that day, Johnson told her brother Matt that she was awakened

upon hearing the first shot, went to her parents' closed door and called out for them,
then heard the second shot and fled the house. (TT 4545:16 - 4548:12).
15.

Johnson was interviewed again the day after the murders. (TT 2424:16-

2426:7). Johnson stated she was awakened when she heard the shower come on, and

then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Id., 2426:8-2428:4). She got out of bed, went
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through her bathroom into the guest bedroom, out into the hall, and to the door of the
master bedroom. (Id.,2428:5-2429:9). Johnson stated her bedroom door was either
closed or open only a crack. (Id., 2429:10-13).
16.

In this interview Johnson claimed she heard the second shot while

standing outside the master bedroom door, but that the doors were open because her
parents propped their door open with a pillow. Johnson stated she did not see or hear
anything indicating a struggle. (IT 2429:14 - 2432:1).
17.

Law enforcement arrived at the Johnson home shortly after Johnson

arrived at the Richards' residence.
18.

Trooper Ross Kirtley, (Kirtley) an Idaho State Police officer was the first to

arrive on the scene. (TT 1645:24 - 1652:11). He was followed shortly thereafter by
Bellevue Marshall Randy Tremble (Tremble). Officer Raul Ornelas (Ornelas) and
Deputy Jamie Shaw (Shaw) arrived soon thereafter. (Id., 1686:21-24).
19.

Kirtley and Tremble did a security search of the north-half of the house.

(TT 1787:4-13).

20.

Diane Johnson's body was located in a bed in the master bedroom. A

cream colored comforter covered her body. (TT 1792:16 - 1793:3). Kirtley pulled the
comforter back with his asp, revealing Diane's body with most of the head missing.
(Id., 1793:19-21).
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21.

The comforter was not collected as evidence, (IT 1986:23 -1987:6), which

was, in retrospect, a mistake. (Id., 2016:21 - 24). ,
22.

About twenty-five days after the murders Johnson told yet another

version of events. She told a relative that the first shot woke her up; she heard a second
shot, ran to her parents' bedroom, and saw blood on the walls and floor. (TT 3684:223690:12).
23.

Johnson's inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did and heard

around the time of the murders are significant in relation to other evidence. Several of
the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted her hair and
appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep in bed when the
murders occurred. (IT 1545:20-1547:18; 1559:14-1560:11; 1818:19-1819:19; 2520:152521:23).
24.

Johnson's claim that her parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door

had been closed was also inconsistent with the presence of Diane's blood and brain
matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the hallway from her parents' room. Part of
Diane's skull was also found in the hallway outside the master bedroom. (IT 1619:201620:10; 1637:5-15; 1655:2-1657:9; 1868:2-18; 2019:24-2020:18; 2020:24-2022:3; 2121:72124:4; 3122:11-3123:20).
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25.

Additionally, Diane's blood was found on the socks Johnson was wearing

the morning of the murders. (1755:8 -1759:8; 3120:21- 3122: 13; 3423:8-14; 3475:193476:3).
26.

Johnson had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent with a recent

impact, such as a rifle recoil. (TT 2248:3 - 2250:9; 2317:6 - 2318:18).
27.

Johnson admitted owning a pink bathrobe (TT 2436:7-18). She admitted

that a right-handed leather glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother
and was usually in the car (Id., 2036:1-2037:6; 2436:19-2437:1; 3596:20-3598:1), and
Johnson claimed there should not have been any bullets in her room (2437:2-17).
28.

It is notable, however, that two unspent .264 caliber cartridges of the type

used in the murders were found in Johnson's bedroom. (TT 2033:11-2034:18). Diane's
blood was found on the cartridges. (Id., 3122:11-3123:24). In addition, the police found
the spent casings from the rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and in the
master bedroom (still in the rifle). (Id., 1840:15-1842:12; 1843:24-1844:15; 1954:111956:21; 2051:3-2053:8; 2912:6-2954:16).
29.

Also significant was evidence law enforcement found in a trash can set

out on the street for collection the morning of the murders. The trash can was pulled
back from the curb by law enforcement shortly before it would have been collected. (TT
1672:19-1673:11). Found in the trash can were: one latex glove and one left-hand

leather glove, (which matched the right-hand glove found in JOMson's bedroom),
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wrapped in a pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Id., 1672:16-1673:17; 1826:161832:14; 1893:19-1902:17; 4566:16-4568:17). Five .25-caliber shells were also found in the
pocket of the robe. (Id.,1900:19-1901:13). Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present
inside the latex glove. (Id., 3106:5 -3110:3).
30.

Inside the robe were paint chips that matched paint on the shirt Johnson

was wearing the morning of the murders. (TT 1755:8-1758:13; 3574:1-3587:21).
31.

The pink robe itself tested positive for blood and DNA from Diane (IT

3114:2-3117:11; 3434:11-3459:3; 3473:13-3475:2), DNA possibly from Alan (id" 3434:113459:3), gunshot residue (id" 3229:15-3238:20), and tissue from Diane. (Id" 3446:193448:18; 3454:16-3455:23). The blood on the robe was consistent with the shooter
having worn it backwards during the shooting. (Id. / 4194:5-4211:21).
32.

With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had

been stored in a closet in a guesthouse located near the Johnson residence. (IT 2418:82419:22; 2702:3-2706:1).
33.

The guesthouse was an apartment above the detached garage on the

Johnson property. Johnson had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there several
times, including the days immediately preceding the murders. (Id., 2037:7-2038:6;
2257:7- 2258:10; 2437:18-2439:23; 2688:25-2690:6; 2715:12-2716:6; 3274:11-25; 3285:63293:7; 3335:14-3336:22).
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34.

Officers obtained a search warrant on the day of the murders and served it

a short time later. While searching the officers located the scope from the murder
weapon in the guesthouse on the bed, and Officer Comelas observed human footprints
in the dew on the lawn going to and from the Johnson home and the guesthouse. (Id.,
1733:20-1738:25; 1842:8-1843:3; 2056:2-2057:22; 2685:12-2686:25; 2706:2-16; PostConviction Hearing Transcript (PCHT) 206:6-208:25).
35.

A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from the guesthouse was also found

in Johnson's bedroom, wrapped in a red bandana on the shelf below where the two
.264-caliber shells were found. (IT 2038:7-2040:10). A nine-millimeter handgun
matching the magazine was in a gun safe in the guesthouse (Id., 2061:11-2062:12).
Johnson had asked her parents for a key to the family's gun safe two days before the
murders. (Id.,3336:10-22). A key to the guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room
(Petitioner's Ex. 4).
36.

The search also produced a box of .25 ammunition in the garage, with five

shells missing. The .22 rifle normally kept in the guest house was in the garage on top
of the freezer, and a spent .264 casing was located in the garage as well. (ld.).
37.

Based upon the evidence obtained by the Blaine County prosecutor, a

grand jury convened and ultimately indicted Johnson for two counts of First Degree
Murder. (Petitioner's Exhibit I, page 511:3 - 512::16; TT 1458:18-1460:7).
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38.

()

Johnson's trial was conducted between February 7 and March 16, 2005.

(IT 1454:16-20, 6173:18-6175:22).
39.

The Honorable R. Barry Wood, District Judge, presided at the trial.

40.

Johnson was represented by two attorneys at trial: Bob Pangburn

(pangburn) and Mark Stephen Rader (Rader).
41.

At the conclusion of the trial Johnson was convicted of both counts of first

degree murder, as well as an enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of the
crime. (IT 6174-6175).
42.

The defense team" 2 included Mr. Patrick Dunn (Dunn), a private
II

investigator who assisted Pangburn and Rader prior to and during the trial. Dunn's
wife was also a member of the team, along with vanous experts who would be available
from time-to-time to consult with counsel, some of whom testified at the trial. See infra,
Finding of Fact ~ 88.
43.

Pangburn practiced law for about twenty years before he surrendered his

license to the Oregon State Bar on or about September 8, 2004. The state of Idaho
suspended Pangburn's license on January 17, 2008 by Order of the Supreme Court. The
Idaho suspension was a result of multiple violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct (see Petitioner's Exhibit 15), including violation of Rule 8.4( c) for conduct
1/

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id.

2

Pangburn also felt that Rader's associate attorney, Anita Moore, was a member of the "team."
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44.

While the court gives the suspension weight in evaluating Pangburn's

credibility, the factthat Pangburn is now suspended does not make his testimony
entirely unworthy of belief. The findings of fact set forth by the court herein regarding
Pangburn's testimony and his conduct are based on the entirety of the record, which
includes his individual testimony. Where the court's findings are based upon
Pangburn's testimony, the court has engaged in the appropriate weighing process and
accepts his testimony as true, notwithstanding his ethical misconduct.
45.

During his lawyering career, Pangburn practiced primarily criminal

defense, including representing hundreds of prisoners in the state of Oregon.
46.

Pangburn tried over 100 cases to jury in Idaho and Oregon.

47.

Pangburn devoted a large amount of time to Johnson's defense, spending

"hundreds and hundreds" of hours on the case between 2003 and 2005. (peRT 279:25280:20).
48.

Before assuming responsibility for the Johnson case, Pangburn

represented a number of people with homicide-related charges. Pangburn also handled
a number of post-conviction and habeas cases involving murder and aggravated
murder in Oregon.
49.

Rader has been licensed to practice law in Oregon since 1973 and in Idaho

since approximately 1990. Rader's practice is focused on aggravated murder and
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capital murder cases in Oregon. He also does some post-conviction work in those kinds
of cases.
50.

The court gives limited weight to Rader's testimony in this case because

he was admittedly confused about several areas of his testimony and he had poor
recollection of the details regarding his beliefs and opinions. (See, e.g., PCHT 188:5189:2). Rader further admitted his bias in that he would like to see Johnson have
another trial. (Id.,195:9-12). This admission causes this court to give even less weight to
Rader's testimony in this proceeding.
51.

Pangburn, on the other hand, testified that the defense team did a "real

good job" of defending Johnson, given what [they] had to work with." (PCHT 268:91/

11). While the court discounts this self-serving statement to some degree, the record
ultimately sustains Pangburn's conclusion that both attorneys representing Johnson
were qualified; both worked diligently on the case and both put forth significant effort
in Johnson's behalf.

52.

Rader has experience with ballistics experts and multiple contacts with

forensic experts due to the focus of his legal practice. Rader was thus familiar, based on
his significant experience, with the evidentiary standards necessary to challenge or
admit expert or forensic testimony in court.
53.

Rader was asked by Pangburn to assist with the Johnson defense

primarily to handle the forensic/scientific evidence. Rader also had prior involvement
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with Dunn, and suggested that the team hire Dunn when there was a falling-out
between Pangburn and a prior investigator.
54.

Dunn has significant experience as an investigator and he is now working

primarily as an investigator on post-conviction criminal cases.
55.

Dunn was hired generally to review and evaluate the police investigation,

review the evidence and witness interviews and assist with trial preparation.
56.

In a general sense, when Dunn is hired as an investigator he initially

receives and reviews material from the defense attorneys, which the attorneys receive
via discovery from the prosecution. This pattern was followed by Dunn, Pangburn and
Rader in this case.
57.

Once Dunn has a grasp of the evidence in the case, he then organizes the

material for trial counsel. Dunn organizes the material chronologically and he also
creates an alphabetical witness listing. Dunn does not generally create written reports
because such reports may have to be provided to the state, thus giving away defense
strategy. Again, Dunn followed this pattern as a member of the Johnson defense team.
58.

Like Rader, Dunn expressed a bias favoring the success of Johnson's post-

conviction petition. (See Rader's Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief). This again causes the court to question Dunn's testimony at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing; however, the court accepts some of Dunn's testimony as accurate
regarding selected details of the case, as is set forth below.
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59.

Dunn had done criminal investigation work for Rader prior to the Johnson

case. Dunn understood that Rader and Pangburn decided to change investigators on
the Johnson case in March 2004 and he was hired thereafter.
60.

Dunn met weekly with Rader, but not as often with Pangburn. Prior to

trial the defense team met less than once per month with both lawyers and Dunn
present.
61.

Pangburn felt that the meetings between the lawyers and Dunn were held

often enough for case preparation. Dunn disagreed,3 but this court concludes that both
counsel prepared adequately for the Johnson trial.
62.

The first thing Dunn received was the Grand Jury transcript. He then

received police reports and witness statements from the police; later in the process he
and Rader received and reviewed the forensic evidence.
63.

One of Dunn's stated concerns regarding Pangburn's preparation

involved Pangburn's obtaining discovery and carrying it around in his trunk,
sometimes for weeks. (peHT 42:17-19). Nevertheless, Dunn ultimately received all
discovery in the case, albeit later than he might have liked.
64.

Dunn had access to all the discovery necessary to prepare the case and to

prepare witness books for every witness in the case in advance of trial.

Dunn swore-out an affidavit in support of Johnson's petition in which he testified that Pangburn was unprepared in
the case. Dunn testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that he had never made such an allegation against
an attorney before.

3
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1,

Pangburn indicated that associate attorney Moore organized the discovery

and copied it for Rader and Dunn. Ultimately the parties received the discovery,
although Pangburn did argue several motions to compel during his representation of
Johnson, (TT 787; 837-39; 863-866), and some information was received late in the
process.
66.

The witness books Dunn compiled consisted of an index in the front and a

copy of every statement that related to an individual. The team had such books for all
witnesses, and for most subject matters. There were three copies of each book: one for
each attorney and a working set which was kept in a room right off the courtroom for
Use during the trial. When the team knew which witnesses were coming up, the books
were available for counsel's review.
67.

The plan for trial was that Rader would handle the forensic experts and

Pangburn would handle all the other witnesses. No exceptions had been discussed to
this plan in advance of the trial.
68.

During trial the attorneys and Dunn would meet every day after trial, and

in the morning, prior to trial, to go over the witness list to make sure everyone was
prepared.
69.

Dunn testified that in the morning meetings, he and Rader would be the

first ones at the courthouse, and they would bring out the books, go through the books
and make any adjustments necessary. Pangburn was not always present for the pretrial
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meetings each day, although Dunn cannot say what Pangburn was doing during these
times.
70.

Pangburn admitted that he made several appearances on the Nancy Grace

television show, (pCHT 273:12-14) and that he attempted to arrange an interview of
Johnson on Nightline. (Id., lines 15-18). While this court has reservations about such
conduct, there has been no showing that Pangburn's media contacts or appearances
undermined trial strategy, affected the jury pool, or otherwise had any casual nexus
with Pangburn's performance or the jury's verdict.
71.

During the early pre-trial phase, there really wasn't a working strategy for

the defense team; the best Dunn could glean is that they wanted to go after Bruno
Santos (Santos).
72.

Dunn did a "fairly in-depth" investigation of Santos, spanning from Utah

to Hailey, Idaho to Montana. Dunn obtained police statements regarding Santos'
alleged gang affiliations and Santos' known associates. Santos had a gang tattoo and
the school was aware of his gang status.
73.

Dunn couldn't interview Santos extensively because Santos "lawyered-

up"; however, Dunn was able to interview Santos one time during the Johnson trial.
74.

Santos was Johnson's boyfriend at the time of the murders, and he was an

initial suspect of both the police and the defense team.
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75.

The record thus establishes that the police did not focus on Johnson to the

exclusion of all other suspects. (PCHT 405:12-13). To the extent that Johnson suggests
that Santos was ruled out as a suspect on the day of the murders, any such claim is not
supported by the evidence.
76.

Despite Dunn's in-depth investigation, he was not able to discover that

Santos was convicted of any felony crimes. (See IT: 860:2-5). Dunn uncovered
information that Santos had been involved in a possible rape of a girl out of Sun Valley,
and he identified the girl and made contact with her father. While the father confirmed
the information Dunn had discovered, the father did not want his daughter subpoenaed
and he moved the daughter out of Idaho.
77.

Through the school, Dunn obtained a record of a number of fights when

Santos was a juvenile.
78.

Through the course of Dunn's investigation, Santos denied any sexual

contact with Johnson; however, the defense team had sheets from Johnson's bed tested,
which showed DNA from Santos, which confirmed in Dunn's mind that Santos had
sexual contact with Johnson.
79.

The court finds that Johnson and Santos were having a sexual relationship

while Johnson was a minor.
80.

Dunn was unable to locate any evidence linking Santos to the commission

of the lohnson murders. The police also had no evidence establishing such a link.
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81.

Pangburn testified that the information the defense team had on Santos

was "not necessarily what they were looking for," which this court concludes means
that there was no evidence indicating that Santos was personally culpable for the
Johnson murders. (PCHT 259:16-17; 284:23-285:3). The court agrees with this
conclusion.
82.

Moreover, the court further concludes that the evidence which the defense

team did have on Santos was largely inadmissible, either due to Santos' assertion of his
5th Amendment rights, or based on the nature of the evidence and evidentiary rulings
made by Judge Wood during trial.
83.

Johnson references alleged statements by Santos about his car possibly

having been in the area of the murders on the morning of September 3; however, there
is no evidence that such statements were made as cited by Johnson. When interviewed
by Detective Harkins, Harkins asked Santos: "What if I told you that someone said that
they seen [sic] your vehicle in the area that morning?" (Petitioner's Exhibit 34, p. 13).
Santos response to this question was: "I don't know, maybe someone, some guy get my
car I don't know, I don't think so. I was asleep .. .." (ld.) Thus, Santos' statement was
clearly not an admission that his car was in the area of the murders on September 3.
84.

Harkins explained to this court that his question was not based on

evidence the police had, but on an interview technique. (pCHT 409:15-22).
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Thus, as a matter of trial strategy, the defense focus moved from Santos to

a "no blood, no guilt" theme. (IT 4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; pcm 264:8-13).
86.

Rader testified that their goal at trial was to show that if Johnson had

pulled the trigger, she would have been covered with blood and other matter, and she
couldn't have gotten out of the room without significant blood on her person. (PCHT
157:2-14).
87.

The court concludes that the defense, both Pangburn and Rader pursued

this "no blood, no guilt" strategy with witnesses and argued the same to the jury. (IT
4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; PCHT 264:8-13; Supplemental Appeal Transcript 270:8-272:25).
88.

The defense also focused their efforts in trying to undermine the state's

case with science, (IT 4604:25-4605:1) and the defense called several scientists to
support their arguments. E.g., Dr. Craig Beaver, id., 6367-6407; Dr. Todd Grey, id"
5350-5379; Michael Howard, id., 4685-4941; Keith Inman, id., 5240 - 5348; Robert
Kerchusky, id" 5045-5130; Dr. Leslie Lundt, id., 5480-5522; Ron Martinez, id" 5179-5191;
and Rocky Mink, id" 5618-5734).
89.

The defense also brought-out the deficiencies in the state's evidence

collection practices, as noted during their opening statement. (IT 4603-4610). These
deficiencies focused on the comforter covering Diane and other items that were not
collected as evidence.
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Dunn testified that he brought shortcomings of the police investigation to

the attention of R~der and Pangburn, i.e., Exhibit 5, which showed a green carpet,
covered with blood, and a towel bar, which items were not taken into evidence. Dunn
also told the attorneys that fingerprints were not taken from the top of the garbage can,
which would have, in his opinion, been a critical identifier as to who opened the can.

See PCH Exhibit 6.
91.

The court finds that the lack of fingerprinting the garbage can was

inconsequential, given the myriad of individuals who had potential contact with the
can.
92.

Finally, the defense relied upon unidentified, but matching fingerprints

found on the scope, the rifle and a box of ammunition to point the finger of blame away
from Johnson.

a. The Comforter.
93.

The allegation regarding the error in failing to request a continuance is

based on late-disclosed discovery regarding the comforter which had covered Diane's
body. The state failed to collect the comforter as evidence during their search, causing a
perceived need for the defense to have additional time to consider issues surrounding
the missing comforter and "what happens to a head when it's shot at close range, those
kinds of things." (PCHT 162:1-7).
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94.

There was little testimony before this court regarcling the comforter which

covered Diane Johnson's body when she was found. The court is without the benefit of
any evidence which indicates what value the comforter might have had, in retrospect,
from a forensic point of view.
95.

Rader testified that the defense was informed ot the comforter not being

collected as evidence at a time close" to trial, but he could not recall how close. (IT
/I

158:24-159:10; 162:3-12).
96.

Rader testified that the defense should have asked for a continuance:

1/

we should have backed up a little bit at that point, ... and asked for a continuance orr]
whatever, however much time the court would do it, give us, to back up and reexamine some of this material and try and find a better way of presenting it at trial...."
(PCHT 121:20-25).

97.

Rader swore-out an affidavit in support of Johnson's case wherein he

concluded that his conduct was ineffective in failing to move for a continuance of the
trial. The court does not accept Rader's conclusions in this regard.
98.

The record shows that Rader was prepared; that both he and Pangburn

conducted examinations and/or made strategic decisions based upon the nature of the
case at the time. While, given the outcome, the court understands how Rader can
second guess his own performance, and that of Pangburn, Rader's conclusions are not
borne-out by the entire record before this court.
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No other witness referenced the need for a continuance or what it would

have done to benefit the defense team.
b. I.S.P. Video/Audio.

100.

Dunn also reviewed a copy of an ISP video/audio which this court

listened to during the evidentiary hearing. (pCH Exhibit 12). Dunn had the audio
enhanced, but the enhanced version was not available for this court.
101.

The audio portion of the recording reveals a number of conversations,

some of which are inaudible, among members of law enforcement.
102.

Johnson played the entirety of the recording at the evidentiary hearing

and asked Sheriff Jerry (Walt) Femling about some of the voices he could identify on the
recording (pcm 335:17-336:12).
103.

The video starts with Trooper Kirtley's stop at roughly 6:10 a.m. on

September 2, 2003, after which Kirtley proceeded to the crime scene. Kirtley was the
first officer at the crime scene and he recorded 4 conversations for about 2.5 hours.
104.

The enhanced audio includes the voice of Sheriff Femling, Trooper Kirtley

and Bellevue Marshall Trumble.
105.

Dunn concluded that the recording held good information for the defense

because it contained the initial impressions of law enforcement regarding the crime
scene and the officers' initial suppositions about the case.
4 The dashboard camera simply video-recorded a house across the street from the Johnsons' home while the officers
were conducting their business inside the Johnson home. The audio recorded Kirtley and others' statements during
the approximately 2.5 hour-period.
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106.

Dunn's synopsis was that the officers did not think it was possible for

Johnson to have committed the crime because the blood spatter was everywhere and
Johnson didn't have any blood on her. Dunn felt the defense should play the enhanced
version of the whole tape; however, counsel disagreed and the recording was not
introduced.
107.

Rader was generally aware of the law enforcement recording which was

played during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Rader's knowledge came from
Dunn; Rader never reviewed the recording himself. (PCHT 185:2-3). Rader further
believed that Pangburn was aware of the recording and that he would seek to admit it
during the cross-examination of Kirtley. (ld., lines 12-16).
108.

Pangburn testified that the recording would not have added much to the

case, but that that tape may have helped and it was probably a mistake not to seek to
admit it. (PCm 269:5-12). However, Pangburn wouldn't go so far as to say he should
have sought to admit the recording, but that, in hindsight, he "would think more about
putting it in." (ld., lines 13-16).
109.

Sheriff Femling (Femling) could be heard on the recording making a

statement that he was concerned about the community or the valley being worried with
a murderer running around and that Femling thought they should concentrate on the
girl. The officers also discussed that Johnson was an unlikely suspect, due to her not
being covered with blood.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 27

(

110.

(

Dunn acknowledged that strategic decisions during trial are within

counsel's discretion and that the same would hold true as to what evidence was
admitted and what cross-examination would be conducted of a particular witness.

c. Division of Labor/Defense Team Interaction.
111.

Rader noted that he was primarily engaged to handle the scientific

experts; however, he testified that he learned a few days before their fingerprint expert,
Robert Kerchusky (Kerchusky) was called, that Pangburn would be handling
Kerchusky's direct examination.
112.

Pangburn indicated that the decision for him to handle the fingerprint

experts was to allow him to be more involved in that part of the case, and to take some
of the load off Rader.
113.

Rader had concerns regarding how the defense team was interacting

throughout their preparation and handling of the trial. He expected the case to be
defended as a team, and to be able to share their opinions; however, Rader felt that
Pangburn did not seem interested in doing that at all. Their conversations were so
limited that they were not engaging as a team.
114.

Pangburn disagreed with this testimony and indicated that he and Rader

worked IItogether" from the beginning of their association. Pangburn recognized that
he was "lead" counsel; however, he and Rader worked well together throughout the
case. Pangburn does not recall handing Rader a witness notebook at the last minute
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and asking Rader to handle the witriess' cross-examination. The court accepts
Pangburn's memory and testimony in this regard, given Rader's credibility and
memory issues previously noted herein. (See supra" 50).
115.

Rader's examination of several lay witnesses was very limited, in that he

asked no questions, or very few questions. However, very little in the record from the
post-conviction evidentiary hearing establishes what information would have been
elicited from those witnesses had they been asked further questions during the murder
trial.
116.

Moreover, this court concludes, based on the weekly and ultimately daily

meetings, at least between Rader and Dunn, that Rader had an adequate grasp of the
facts regarding such witnesses when he asked them limited or no questions.

d. Rader's Knowledge of the Law and Scientific Principles.
117.

The trial record also establishes that Rader fought for the admission of the

defense scientific tests and experiments which had been done seeking to replicate the
blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane Johnson was shot in the head. The
experiments used multiple media, i.e., coconuts,'melons, pig's heads, Styrofoam heads,
(TT 4506:17-19), containing multiple substances, i.e., plastic bags with sponges,
pudding, half and half colored blue and red. (Id., lines 19-23).
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118.

Rader's efforts were made during an extensive hearing on the state's

.motion to exclude these experiments, primarily the experiment conducted using a
coconut. (IT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503).
119.

Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic

pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between
the coconut used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508).
120.

Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-

replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment," he would "take another look at it."
(IT 4509:17-22).
121.

At the hearing before this court, Rader testified that, in response to the

court's ruling, he asked his experts "to go back and find, see if there's something else
[they] could do," whether there was "some other object that [they] could shoot/ but his
experts "didn't come up with anything." (PCHT 166:13-167:2).
122.

In hindsight, Rader testified he could have gone out to ... various
1/

defender agencies in various places around the country" to "see if [he] could find
different experts or different information somehow." (Id., 169:9-24).
123.

Johnson presented no evidence at the hearing regarding what experts

Rader would have located had he "reached out," nor did Johnson present any evidence
regarding what other experiments or reconstruction options could have been presented
to the trial court.
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124.

Thus, there is no evidence before this court which shows what any

additional testing could have provided by way of a test which would have been
admissible. Six years have now passed, and nothing has been presented to this court to
show that any such evidence exists.
125.

While Rader felt that he should have reached out further, to other defense

groups, in seeking to find different. experts or different information regarding the blood
spatter testimony, nothing has been provided to establish that such reaching-out would
have accomplished anything more than the defense tried to accomplish at the time of
trial.

e. Facts Regarding Cross-examination.
126.

The defense also raised issues regarding cross-examination of several

witnesses. Those matters are detailed individually as to those witnesses, below.
A.
127.

Sheriff Walt Femling.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked Sheriff

Femling (Femling) whether he recalled "making statements to the press very shortly
after [the murders], assuring the public that there was no concern for their public
safety." (Tr., p.328, Ls.4-7). Femling answered:
Yes. I thought that was very important to let my community
know that I did not believe that this was a random act of
violence or we had some killers out there running, that were
just randomly picking homes and, you know, shooting
people.
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So the crime scene definitely told me that probably was not
the case.
(pCHT 328:8-15).
Femling further explained his initial impressions based upon the crime scene:
I think what the crime scene was telling me pretty quick was
that it was not committed from, by somebody from the
outside as a random killer or killers that came into the scene.
It was somebody that was familiar with the house and the
contents of the house and that the information that I was
getting from investigators who had talked to Uohnson] was
not adding up to what the crime scene was telling me. So at
that time, it was, you know, something's not right here from
potentially my only witness to these two homicides.
(PCHT 326:12-23).
128.

Femling also testified before this court that he did not, at least initially,

"form[] the theory" that Johnson murdered her parents "out of revenge." (pCHT
338:11-25).
129.

Notably, it took weeks before Femling and his department ruled out

Johnson's boyfriend, Bruno Santos, as a suspect. Femling did not want to believe
Johnson committed the murders because Johnson went to school with Femling's son
and it was hard to believe that she could have killed her parents. However, a crucial
piece of evidence leading Femling to believe Johnson was involved" came in six weeks
after th[e] case started." (Id., 340:17-342:4; 350:20-351:25).
130.

That crucial piece of evidence was Johnson's DNA on lithe gloves that

were wrapped in the bathrobe found in the garbage can." (PCHT 341:10-14).
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Femling further testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing about

the scope of the investigation surrounding the murders:
You know, lean' t give you a time when I, you know,
absolutely felt confident that it was - [Johnson] acted alone.
I can tell you, once again, is that we worked really hard to
make sure that we covered every basis that we could, and
Bruno Santos was not involved. We believe very strongly
that he was not involved. There is no evidence at all to put
him at that scene of that crime....
(pCRT 349:5-13).
132.

In addition to investigating Santos, law enforcement also investigated: (1)

Janet Sylten, the cleaning lady Johnson claimed to have heard at 2:00 in the morning
outside her house the morning of the murders (PCll 354:23-356:1,358:20-22); (2) Mel
Speegle, the owner of the murder weapon (id., 356:2-7, 361:3-362:1); (3) the possibility of
a robbery, which there were no signs of at the residence (id., 356:8-24); and (4) whether
someone escaped up the embankment behind the house based on Johnson's claim that
the killer went out the back door (id., 356:25-357:19).
133.

Consistent with his testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,

Femling testified at trial that, on the day of the murders, he identified four persons of
interest - Speegle, Santos, Johnson, and the cleaning lady. (TT 2417:10-2418:2). Also
consistent with his post-conviction testimony, Femling testified at trial that he did not
want to believe Johnson committed the murders and he continued to investigate other
possibilities. (Id., 2424:1-7).
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134.

Femling also testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law enforcement

interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports, spent $517,000
investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5 people to the
case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative leads. (IT
2458:4-2461:16).
135.

Rader cross-examined Femling at trial. (TT 2461-2496; 4057-4059).

136.

Johnson did not ask Rader any questions at the post-conviction

evidentiary about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Femling. (See

generally PCHT 138-195).
B. Steve Harkins.

137.

At the Johnson trial, in response to a question on direct about how many

"calls or interviews" were conducted with Santos, Detective Harkins (Harkins) testified:

"I don't know if I can give you an exact number. I talked to him a number of times.
Numerous interviews. Weekly contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We
made contact over the phone, met in person. I didn't document every contact I had
with him." (IT 2191:1-6).
138.

Harkins further testified he had spoken to Santos "over a hundred" times

lI[o]ver the last year and a half," "maybe a lot more." (Id.,2114:20-23).
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139.

(')

Johnson alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to "adequately cross-

examine" Harkins about this statement, claiming I'police reports and supplements do
not support this bald assertion." (petition, p.l0, ,16.a.i.).
140.

Johnson further alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to adequately

cross-examine Harkins IIregarding the lack of depth to the search of Santos [sic]
residence [or] outside dumpster," his IIfailure to acquire fingerprints from [Santos']
known associates," lithe inconsistencies in statements made by Santos [sic] family
members, including his mother and cousin," or about lithe fact that .25 caliber
ammunition was found in Bruno Santos [sic] residence and in the pink robe found in
the trash can at the crime scene." (Petition, p.l0, , 16.a.i, p.12, ~ 16.a.vi.).
141.

Pangburn cross-examined Harkins at trial. (IT 2169-2222, 2235-2244).

142.

Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about the number of times he

indicated he had spoken with Santos, nor did Pangburn ask Harkins about any alleged
inconsistencies in statements made by Santos or his family members or the ammunition
found in Santos' residence or the Johnson's garbage can. (See generally id.). Although
Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about his failure to "fingerprint[]" Santos'
IIknown associates," Pangburn did ask Harkins about his investigation of Santos'
/I

5

associa te s ."5

Marshal Tremble was also asked about his investigation of Santos' "associates." (IT 1861:16-1863:24).
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143.

(

Pangburn's cross-examination did cover several areas, (See generally TI,

pp. 2197-2202), including Santos' associates who were "law breakers/, (IT 2199:1-9) and
Santos' "drug dealer connection." (Id., 2197:2-12, 2200:16-22). Harkins was even asked:
"did you look for someone who may, at the request of Bruno Santos, kill these people?"
(Id., 2200:5-7).

144.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn

any questions about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Harkins. (See

generally PCHT 237-279). Johnson did call Harkins as a witness at the evidentiary
hearing, but Johnson also failed to ask him any questions about his testimony.regarding
the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See generally id., 378-441).
145. Johnson also did not introduce any "police reports" or "supplements" at
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing to rebut Harkins' trial testimony about the
number of times he had contact with Santos.
146. Johnson did ask Harkins about the extent of his search of Santos'
residence. Harkins testified in that regard that he did not recall what his role in the
search was, i.e., whether he "actually did the searching or instructed other officers to, to
search the residence." (PCRT 406:20-24). Harkins acknowledged the "trash
receptacles" at the apartment complex where Santos lived were not searched. (Id.,
407:17-22). Harkins explained the "trash receptacles" were not searched "because [he]
and ten other detectives probably didn't think it was necessary." (Id., 410:1-3).
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147.

Johnson did not introduce any evidence regarding what a more extensive

search of Santos' residence or a search of the "trash receptacles" would have uncovered.
148.

Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing

whether any .25 automatic shells were found at Santos' residence and Harkins agreed
that those were found. (Pcm 410:11-25). Harkins further testified that he was aware
that .25 shells were found in the pocket of the robe discovered in the garbage can at the
Johnson's house. 6 (Id., 411:1-6).
149.

With respect to his involvement in the investigation of Consuelo Cedeno

and Jane Lopez, Harkins testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not recall
interviewing them, but he was sure he talked to them "at one point." (pcm 411:10-14).
150.

Johnson did not ask Harkins about any inconsistencies in Cedeno's

testimony but she did ask Harkins questions about Lopez's testimony. Specifically,
Johnson asked: I/[I]f I told you that those phone numbers [that were subpoenaed]
verified that Jane Lopez did not in fact call Bruno nor the home phone number when
she originally told you and when she testified before the court, do you think 1'd be
mistaken about that?" (pCHT 413:7-12).
151.

Harkins responded that he had "an explanation of why they weren't

recovered." (Id., lines 13-14). That explanation was that if a call was made from I/Qwest
to Qwest numbers, local carriers, [they] would not be recorded," and that "in 2003 the
Exhibit 20, admitted at trial, was a photograph of five rounds of .25 ammunition found in the pocket of Jolmson's
robe. (IT 1900:19-1901 :13). Exhibit 103, also admitted at trial, was a photograph ofa box of Remington .25
automatic shells with five missing rounds. (ld., 2048:1-16).
6
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whole valley's local phone carrier was Qwest." (Id., 414:3-5, 15-17) . So, if Jane Lopez
had "called from the school to a home number, it wouldn't be recorded." (Id., 416:3-4).
152.

Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing

whether he "learned quickly" who Santos' close associates were." (PCHT 422:16-18).
1/

Harkins answered: "I don't know which ones you're referring to. There was several
interviewed that were friends of his." (Id., 422:19-21). johnson specifically asked about
1/

Ayala," and Harkins agreed he was interviewed. (Id., lines 22-24). Johnson then asked

whether Harkins ever "took any DNA swab from Ayala." (Id.,422:25-423:1). Harkins
testified that he could not recall. (Id., 423:3).
153.

Johnson did not ask Harkins about fingerprinting Ayala, nor did she ask

him about any other of Santos' associates."
If

C. Bruno Santos.

154.

Johnson's Petition alleges counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-

examine Bruno Santos about the abundant information" that Santos "was dealing
1/

drugs," IIhad gang connections," and had "committed the crime of statutory rape."
(Petition, p.13, 1 16.d).
155.

While both attorneys handled both lay and expert witnesses during the

trial, Pangburn generally handled the lay witnesses. Nevertheless, Rader did conduct
the cross-examination of several lay witnesses, including Santos. (PCHT: 172:19-173:2).
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156.

The court concludes that the claim regarding a last-minute hand-off of

Santos' cross-examination to Rader is disproved by the record.
157.

The state brought a motion in limine under I.R.E. 609 and 404(b) regarding

Santos' prior history. (See IT 2739:8-24). The state sought to preclude the defense from
asking Santos about his arrest on October 30, 2004, or about "statutory rape" or "having
sexual relations with Sarah Johnson." (Id., 2739:8-2740:3).
158.

The prosecutor objected to any inquiry on the arrest as irrelevant and on

the grounds that Santos would "be claiming the Fifth" on any "pending case" and
would also "invoke his privilege not to incriminate himself" on his sexual relationship
with Jolmson. (IT 2739). The state also objected to any questions on a previous battery
charge when Santos was a juvenile. (Id., 2740:24-2741:7).
159.

Counsel for Santos confirmed that he advised Santos to "invoke his

privilege against self-incrimination with respect to any questions relating to drug
activity" and any questioning regarding his sexual relationship with Johnson. (IT
2743:12-15,2751:24-2752:18).
160.

Rader responded to the state's motion and ultimately agreed not to

inquire of Santos regarding his October 30 arrest or the "juvenile information." (TT
2745:4-17; see also p. 2748:1-2749:6 (Rader explaining in detail why Santos' gang
involvement and "other bad acts" should be admitted); p.2750:4-2751:1 (Rader offering
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further argument regarding why he believed certain evidence relating to Santos should
be admitted».
161.

Rader thus argued in specific detail referencing Santos' history and prior

acts, indicating the scope of the cross-examination that he wished to conduct.
162.

For example, Rader argued that he intended "to ask questions about

[Santos'] gang involvement ... and the fact that [Santos] admitted having sexual
relations with Sarah Johnson seven times, and she was a minor at the time and he was
an adult.... Then [he intended] to ask him about his gang connections and the story
he told the police about his gang involvement." (IT 2747:2-11).
163.

Rader showed additional direct and significant knowledge of Santos' past,

as well as the defense purpose for their intended cross-examination. (IT 2748:1-2749:6).
164.

Judge Wood essentially granted the state's motion in limine; however, he

offered the option of a stipulation regarding some of Santos' history. (IT 2754:162755:19).
165.

Although the trial court limited the scope of Santos' cross-examination, '

much of the information that was subject to the state's motion in limine had already
been elicited through cross-examination of other witnesses. For example, during crossexamination of Femling, Rader elicited that Santos was a "look-out" for a fight, which
resulted in a suspension. (TT 2474:8-2475:3). Rader also asked Femling about Santos'
reported drug use, to which Femling responded: "I think we did show that he does
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have involvement in drugs" and that he had "used illegal drugs/' (id., 2475:21-2476:7),
and examination of Detective Harkins revealed that Santos had a drug dealer
1/

connection." (Id., 2197:2-12,2200:16-22).
166.

On direct examination at trial, Santos testified: (1) he was dating Johnson

when the murders occurred (TT 2761:15-19); (2) Alan Johnson came to his apartment the
weekend before the murders and threatened that if he did not "leave his daughter
alone, ... he was going to hit [him] and ... put [him] in jail" (id., 2762:5-18); (3) he saw
Johnson the Monday before the murders and she was acting "weird" (id., 2763:9-2764:7);
(4) he spent the night at home the night before the murders (id., 2764:16-20); (5) his
cousin, Jane Lopez, called him about the murders the morning they occurred (id.,
2764:24-2765:5); (6) he was surprised about the murders and went to the Johnson's
home to see what happened (id., 2765:6-2766:9); (7) he allowed law enforcement to
search his car and apartment, he submitted to fingerprint and blood testing, and gave
them his clothes (id., 2766:16-2767:3); (8) he saw Johnson at the hospital the day of the
murders at which time she hugged him and told him she loved him and said she was
sorry and "not to worry" (id., 2768:7-2768:5); (9) he was deported in September 2003
and returned to the United States to testify (id., 2768:17-2769:4); (10) he was not at the
Johnson's house the night before' the murders and did not remember Johnson telling
him there were guns in the guest house (id., 2769:5-10); and (11) there was a wedding at
the Johnson's house the weekend before the murders that Johnson wanted him to
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attend, but Alan would not let him, which upset Johnson (id., 2770:21-2770:6). Santos
denied having anything to do with murdering Alan and Diane. (Id., 2769:11-13).
167.

After Santos testified to these facts, and based on Judge Wood's ruling,

Rader indicated that the defense" decided not to enter ~to a stipulation and ... decided
not to cross examine Mr. Santos ... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15).
168.

Thus, this court concludes that Rader was well-versed and well prepared

to cross-examine Santos, but that given Judge Wood's ruling and Santos' intention to
assert his 5th Amendment privilege, the defense, as a matter of strategy, chose not to ask
any questions at all.
169.

This court recognizes that Johnson asked both Rader and Pangburn at the

post-conviction evidentiary hearing about the decision not to cross-examine Santos.
170.

Despite Rader's vigorous response to the state's motion in limine

regarding the scope of Santos' cross-examination, Rader claimed at the evidentiary
hearing that Pangburn would, without any "warning," have Mr. Rader cross-examine
witnesses he had not planned on cross-examining, including Santos. (peRT 172:19-24).
171.

Rader could not recall how many witnesses he cross-examined, or even

recall the witnesses he was responsible for, yet he claimed Pangburn gave him the
responsibility of cross-examining Santos without any prior notice. (PCHT 172:13-173:2;
188:5-189:2).
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172.

Pangburn denied Rader's assertions, testifying that the decision to have

Rader cross-examine Santos and other witnesses was not made at the last minute, and
that Rader did not object to cross-examining any particular witness. (peHT 282:19283:19).
173.

The court again accepts Pangburn's testimony in this regard because it is

more credible than Rader' 5, given Mr. Rader's involvement in arguing the motion in
limine, during which he demonstrated extensive knowledge of the information
available on which Santos could be cross-examined and the reasons why he believed
such cross-examination should have been permitted. Pangburn's testimony is also
more believable considering Rader's general inability to remember even who he crossexamined.
174.

Most significantly, Rader still believed at the time of the post-conviction

hearing that he handled the fingerprint evidence, even though the record clearly
indicates Pangburn handled that evidence.
175.

Johnson also called Santos as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing. This court concluded, as had Judge Wood, that Santos could invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during the evidentiary hearing. When
asked about his "gang connections/' Santos did just that, declining to answer any
questions on that subject. (PCHT 482:10-14).
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Given this court's ruling, and Santos' counsel's :indication that he would

continue to assert his privilege, Johnson did not ask Santos about the other topics she
claimed in her Petition that trial counsel was :ineffective for fail:ing to :inquire :into, i.e.,
1/

deal:ing drugs" and whether he had" committed the crime of statutory rape."7

(petition, p.13, ~ 16.d; PCHT 472-490).
D. Consuela Cedeno.
177.

With respect to Ms. Cedeno, Johnson alleges in her Petition:
Mr. Pangburn had been provided information based on
prior statements of Consuelo Cedeno wherein she insisted
her son Bruno Santos had not driven the car the morning of
the murders because there was dew on the w:indshield.
Further, Ms. Cedeno asserted in pre-trial statements that she
checked the mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno was ly:ing
about where he had been.... Ms. Cedeno testified at trial
that she didn't pay attention to such things. Yet, Trial
Counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno.

(Petition, p.12, ~ 16.a.v. (capitalization orig:inal, citations omitted)).
178.

At trial, Ms. Cedeno testified (through an interpreter), in relevant part, as

follows:
Q:
Okay, the morning Alan and Diane Johnson were killed,
Tuesday morning, did you go to work that morning?

A:

Yes.

7 Nor did Johnson ask either Mr. Rader or Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to enter into a stipulation regarding
the sexual nature of Johnson's relationship with Santos. (See generally PCHT pp. 138-187, 196-198,237-279).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 44

(),

Do you recall seeing Bruno in the house that morning when
you went to work?
Q:

A:

Yes.

Q:

What was he doing?

A:

He was sleeping.

Q:

All right, and about what time do you go to work?

A:
Well, exactly, I couldn't really tell you. I don't remember,
but I think around 7:30, 8:00. I always leave around 7:30 or 8:00.
Q:

Okay, where was Bruno sleeping at that time?

A:
In a mattress in the living room. And then my bedroom is
right next to it.
And when you left to work that morning, the morning Alan
and Diane were killed, did you see Bruno's car in the parking lot?
Q:

A:
It's actually my car, and I always take it; and sometimes he
does take it, too. But it's usually just me, because I am the one that
has the key, so it was parked.
And could you tell whether or not it looked like the car had
been driven that morning before you got into it?
Q:

A:

No.

Q:

And how could she tell?

A:

Because I have the key. I have the key.

Miss Cedeno, was there anything on the window, was there
. dew on the window?
Q:
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A:
Well, no, no. I don't pay attention to things like that. But
no, I didn't look.
Q:
But it's her car and she had the keys to it? It's your car, and
you had the keys to it, is that correct?

A:

Always.

(IT 2774:19-2776:9).
179.

In response to this testimony, Rader indicated that the defense would not

be cross-examining Ms. Cedeno. (IT 2776:12-13).
180.

Prior to this decision being made, the defense investigator Dunn had

reviewed the statements of Cedeno and Jane Lopez (Lopez). (See PCH Exhibit 13, a
transcript of the interview of Cedeno and Lopez, conducted by two law enforcement
officers, with Lopez translating for Cedeno).

Cedeno is Santos' mother; Lopez is

Santos' cousin.
181.

Dunn found some things problematic with Lopez and Cedeno's

statements. Cedeno gave statements to the police concerning the condition of Santos'
(her) vehicle, i.e., that it had dew on the windshield and that she had checked the
odometer to see whether Santos had been driving the night of the murders.
182.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dunn testified that he made

counsel aware of information that Ms. Cedeno gave statements to the police
/I

concerning ... the condition of Bruno's vehicle, which was actually her vehicle," that
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there was" dew on the window, that she checked the odometer and various things like
that." (pCHT 62:18-23).
183.

Dunn checked with the weather service and found that there was no dew8

that day, which made it a contradictory statement to him. Dunn made Pangburn aware
of that information. (pCHT 63:3-7).
184.

While examining Rader at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,

Johnson asked Rader about his decision not to cross-examine Cedeno. (PCHT 178:1521). Rader testified that he did not "remember doing that, but [he] wouldn't be
surprised if [he] did." (Id., 178:22-23).
185.

Rader further testified that, although he did not remember that Cedeno

made certain statements to police about keeping track of the mileage on the car or that
Santos was always lying to her," he was not prepared to cross-examine her because
II

Mr. P.angbum "handed off that witness." (Id. / 179:13-180:5).
186.

Johnson called Ms. Cedeno as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing. (PCHT pp. 457-468). Cedeno largely denied any recollection of the events
surrounding the murders of Alan and Diane. (PCHT pp.460-468).
187.

With respect to the only claim in Johnson's Petition regarding the cross-

examination of Cedeno - that counsel failed to cross-examine her regarding her
statements to law enforcement that she checked the mileage on the car and saw dew on
The court notes that Officer Cornelas testified about footprints in the grass at the Johnson residence and the heavy
dew that morning, which directly contradicts Dunn's testimony on this point. The court find's Officer Comelas'
testimony more credible on this point than that of Dunn.
8
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the windshield the morning of the murders - Cedeno testified she did not remember
making either statement to law enforcement. (PCHT 464:7-468:7).
188.

This court did not find any value from Cedeno's testimony at the post-

conviction evidentiary hearing. She certainly appeared to be a hostile witness to all .
concerned, and the breadth of her loss of or lack of memory is astounding.
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this record to conclude what Cedeno knows now, or
what she knew in 2005 at the time of trial, to support any factual conclusion in that
regard.
189.

This court cannot conclude, as a matter of fact, that Pangburn just "passed

off" the cross-examination to Rader, given the overall distrust this court has for Rader's
testimony and his lack of memory regarding the facts.
E. lane Lopez.

190.

As to Jane Lopez, Johnson's Petition alleges:

[A] discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial
testimony and proof to the contrary found in phone records,
indicating Bruno Santos was not at his mother's house. Trial
Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy, yet, Trial
Counsel failed to utilize the records on cross-examination.
(Petition, p.12, , 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted)).
191.

At trial, Ms. Lopez, who worked at the Blaine County High School at the

time of the murders, testified that after she heard about the murders, she called Santos
around 8:30 a.m. (IT 2789:14-2791:20).
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192.

Lopez testified that first she called Santos' house, "and he didn't answer,"

so she "called his cell phone, and he answered." (IT 2791:22-24). She asked Santos
"where he was, and he said, I at home. 1II (Id., 2791:24-25). When Lopez asked why he
did not answer the home phone, Santos stated he was sleeping and told Lopez that if
she did not believe him, she should call him again at the home number. (Id., 2791:252792:3). Lopez testified that she then did call Santos at home, "he answered the

phone/' and she told him about the murders. (Id., 2792:3-8). According to Lopez,
Santos "seemed really surprised and really shocked." (ld., 2792:22-25).
193.

Dunn obtained information about these phone calls to the Cedeno

residence which he felt directly conflicted with statements made by Lopez regarding
her telephone calls with Santos the morning of the murders.
194.

Dunn contends that Exhibits 9,10, 11 and 40, when taken together, set

forth that Lopez's statements were incorrect and the phone calls were not made as
Lopez said. Dunn therefore concluded that Santos was not at home when Lopez said he
was. Dunn made that information known to Pangburn because he thought it was
critical.
195.

Dunn prepared a witness book for Lopez and one for Cedeno. Dunn

included Exhibit 13 in the books he provided Pangburn.
196.

Rader cross-examined Lopez at trial, asking whether those were the "only

phone calls" she made to Santos. (IT 2794:6-7). Lopez answered, "yeah./I (IT 2794:15).
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197.

Ms. Lopez reiterated this version of events at the post-conviction

evidentiary hearing. (PCHT 370:22-372:10, 374:19-375:1). Lopez did not, however,
remember the actual phone numbers she called. (Id., 375:1-25).
198.

Johnson did not attempt to impeach Ms. Lopez with any phone records

during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (pCHT 368-376).
199.

Rader testified that he was simply handed the witness book for Cedeno,

and that he was not prepared to conduct her cross-examination. In retrospect Rader
indicated that the defense team was "incompetent" by his not requesting a brief recess
or continuance to allow him to familiarize himself with the matters contained in Lopez's
witness book. (PCHT 181:2-182:8).
200.

This court has reviewed Exhibits 9,10,11 and 40, along with the testimony

from the post-conviction evidentiary hearing in this regard. The court concludes that
these exhibits do not establish the facts which Dunn asserts they do. Rather, the court
concludes that the testimony given by Lopez was more probable, that she attempted to
call Santos' cell phone, and thereafter that she called Santos at home on a land line from
the school. This call was made via a Quest land line-to-land line call, which would not
be traceable through any type of documentation. (PCHT 414:3-17).
F. Raul Ornelas.

201.

Johnson's Petition alleges trial counsel "fail[ed] to adequately cross-

examine Officer Raul Ornelas who testified regarding footprints allegedly observed in
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wet grass in the back yard," and "[s]pecifically, ... failed to point out the [sic] Tim
Richards, the neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked the very area of the
back yard later observed by Ornelas," and counsel"further failed to highlight the fact
that Ornelas concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person, thereby
pointing blame from Gohnson] alone and onto unidentified murders." (petition, p.l0"
16.a.ii.).
202.

At trial, Tim Richards, (Richards) who was not called as a witness at the

post-conviction evidentiary hearing, testified that after Johnson came to his home
reporting that her parents had been shot, he walked down the gravel road" by the
1/

Johnson residence and "peered into the backyard," then "went around the back side of
the guest house" where "there's a little bit more grave1." (IT 1586:7-10, 1607:15-25).
Richards further testified that there is a dirt hill behind the guest house and that he did
not see any footprints going up the hill. (TT 1608:4-18).
203.

Thus, contrary to the assertions in Johnson's Petition, there is no evidence

that Mr. Richards "walked the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas."
Rather, Mr. Richards only testified that he walked down the gravel road, not that he
walked in the grass, which is where Officer Ornelas observed the footprints.
204.

With respect to footprints, Officer Ornelas (Ornelas) testified on direct

examination at trial that, after responding to the Johnson residence, he was "looking
around" and "noticed that there were tracks in the lawn." (TT 1735:17-18). The prints
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were "due north to the back of th[e] guesthouse" and "disappeared there by the stairs."
(Id., 1736:10-12).
205.

In all, Ornelas saw "two or three sets of footprints" because the grass was

dewy, including "footprints that led back to the garage." (IT 1736:20-1737:15). Ornelas
could not, however, tell whether the prints belonged to more than one person. (Id.,
1737:20-22). Ornelas did not observe any footprints going up the embankment behind
the house or from the "patio that leads off of the bedroom ... on the northeast side."
(Id., 1738:14-25, 1739:11-19).
206.

Pangburn cross-examined Ornelas at trial. (IT 1759-1772). On cross-

examination, Pangburn specifically asked Ornelas about the footprints he observed in
the yard and his failure to conduct an extensive search" of the hillside for footprints.
/I

(Id., pp.1765-1771).
207.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn

about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas. (See generally PCHT
pp.239-279).
208.

Johnson did, however, inquire of Ornelas regarding his recollection of the

footprints he observed on the morning of the murder. (peRT 205:15-18). Ornelas
reiterated that he observed footprints in the backyard and again described those prints.
(Id., pp.205-209). Ornelas further testified that he was not aware of "anybody else" who
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had "been in the backyard looking for a possible perpetrator prior to [his] arrival." (Id.,
209:8-15).
209.

Also contrary to Johnson's assertion, Officer Ornelas did not "conclude[]

the footprints were made by more than one person;" in fact, he specifically testified that
he could not tell. The testimony that "there were two or three sets of footprints" is not
equivalent to the footprints having been made by more than one person.
G. Stuart Robinson.

210.

In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsell/should have been aware"

that "Officer Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted that no latent prints were
found at the crime scene" but fI[ d]iscoverable documents[ ] made absolutely clear that
this testimony was inaccurate and false testimony, in that the record reveals that thirty
nine (39) latent prints were found at the scene ...." (petition, p.13, ,16.b.).
211.

Stuart Robinson testified to this court about his collection of evidence at

the crime scene, and particularly about the testimony he gave before the grand jury,
wherein he testified that the Idaho State Forensics lab "could not locate any prints that
could be identified." (PCHT 231:11-17). Robinson's answer was in response to a
question from the prosecutor, Mr. Thomas, asking "as part of your case review, as far as
you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the scope, or the casings?"

(Id., lines 11-15).
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The court finds that Robinson's answer was correct to the question asked

by the prosecutor. The fingerprints were not identified at that point in time.
213.

Rader cross-examined Robinson at trial and did not attempt to impeach

him with his grand jury testimony. (IT pp. 2069-2082.).
214.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson read the following

excerpt from Robinson's grand jury testimony to him:

Mr. Robinson, that [grand] juror asked: You say you found a .264
casing in the garage and one in the chamber. I'm wondering if any
prints were taken and found on those casings.
[The prosecutor] interjected, as it's his right to do, and said: Good
point. Let me ask you this, Detective Robinson. Did you collect the
gun, the scope, the casings, and probably a whole host of other
, things to send for fingerprint analysis?
And you said at that time -- this is back in October of 2003 -- yes,
we did.
Question [by the prosecutor]: Now, on the gun and the scope and
the casing, did your Idaho State Police lab do that analysis or
attempt to do that analysis?

Mr. Robinson: Yes, that's correct.
[The prosecutor] asked you the question: Now, based on your -- on
your, I guess, investigation and as part of your case review, as far
as you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the
scope, or the casings?
And you answered: They could not locate any prints that could be
identified.
(PCHT 230:19-231:17).
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Johnson then asked Robinson to agree that the testimony was inaccurate.

(pCHT 232:15-17). Robinson did not agree and explained that, contrary to Johnson's
interpretation of the testimony, his testimony accurately stated that the prints could not,
at that time, be identified. (Id., 232:18-234:2; see also id., 236:21-237:3).
216.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Rader

about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Robinson. (See generally PCHT,
pp. 138-187, 196-199).

f Facts Regarding Fingerprint Issues.
217.

Rader was also involved with pre-trial interviews wi~ fingerprint expert

Robert Kerchusky, (Kerchusky), but Rader testified that he became aware some time
before trial that Pangburn was going to present Kerchusky as a witness. (pCHT 186:618).
218.

Rader met with Kerchusky and Kerchusky had some concerns about the

information given him by the state; however, Rader did not remember any discussion
with Kerchusky before the trial about Kerchusky's opinion regarding the freshness of
the fingerprints. (Id., 187:3-10).
219.

At trial, Tina Walthall, (Walthall) a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho

State Police, testified that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos,
Alan Johnson, Diane Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (the cleaning lady), Russell
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Nuxoll (the cleaning lady's boyfriend), Matthew Johnson aohnson's brother) and Robin
LeHat (the cleaning lady's employer). (TT 3009:16-20).
220.

Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints lifted from the

crime scene. (TT 3018:2-5). After those comparisons, certain fingerprints taken from
the crime scene remained unidentified, including fingerprints found on the stock of the
rifle (Id., 3027:20-3028:22), the scope from the rifle (Id., 3042:22-3044:2), and two boxes of
.264 shells (Id., 3049:-3052:3).
221.

A search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) prior

to trial using three of the unidentified prints also revealed no matches to any of the
unidentified fingerprints. (TT 3045:1-3046:10,3053:5-11,3066:1-13).
222.

Walthall repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to

determine when it was left (TT 3028:13-17,3044:22-25,3052:22-25; 3058:19-3062:11,
3073:5-15). Walthall specifically stat~d: (1) "many, many years can pass and you might
still find usable fingerprints on" paper or cardboard (TT 3060:10-11); (2) she has
discovered prints off of nonporous surfaces more than a year later (id., 3061:4-5); (3) one
would expect to find fingerprints more than a year old if nothing happened between
"when they were deposited and when [they were] processed" (id., 3061:20-25); and (4)
"it is probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a year, providing there
has been nothing to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which is true even on a
nonporous surface (id., 3062:3-6).
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223.

The defense called Kerchusky to testify at Johnson's trial, and again before

this court.

224.

During the trial, Kerchusky was asked by Pangburn how long fingerprints

can last. He replied that " we can't be sure how long they're going to last," but that

"pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm
concerned." (IT 5070:6-12; see also 5128:18-5129:16 (latent prints on a non-porous
surface will not last more than one year)).
225.

Kerchusky further testified that fingerprints will dry up and evaporate

over the course of one year. (IT 5074:7-9). Kerchusky also agreed, however, that it is
fair to say that a fingerprint on a box could last for years and years and years. (ld.,
5075:9-14).
226.

Mr. Kerchusky, however, acknowledged that aging of fingerprints on

nonporous surfaces is a controversial subject because "there's so many variables as far
as weather, where it's located. I mean there's so many things that come into it, there's
no way in the world anybody could write any article on it." (TT 5107:3-6).
227.

Kerchusky also acknowledged that fingerprints on porous surfaces can

last for years and that there are some "rare" instances where a latent print that was over
a year old could be found on a nonporous surface. (TT 5130:8-16). Kerchusky further
testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, he "still would
have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not." (TT 5108:1-6).
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In 2009, approximately four years after Johnson's criminal trial, Walthall

compared the unidentified prints from the murder scene to prints belonging to Mr.
Christopher Kevin Hill (Hill). (PCHT 652:2-21). Walthall testified at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing that, of the previously unidentified fingerprints, Hill's matched
those that were found on the scope, the boxes of ammunition, and the rifle. (Id., 654:2-

22; see also p. 659:11-14).
229.

Walthall also testified, as she did at trial, about "aging" fingerprints and

how long fingerprints can last. (See generally PCHT, pp.661-670). Walthall reiterated the
opinion previously expressed at trial that fingerprints can last longer than a year. (Id.,
670:4-11).
230.

Mr. Kerchusky also testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.

(See generally PCHT pp. 538-638). Kerchusky's post-conviction testimony was
substantially similar to his trial testimony in that he testified that fingerprints left on
nonporous surfaces "will be gone within a year." (ld., 553:15-554:10).
231.

Kerchusky also referred to the prints on the rifle, scope, and ammunition

(Christopher Kevin Hill's prints) as "fresh" because, according to him, any prints left on
the gun before Mr. Speegle put it in his closet would have been wiped off by the clothes
hanging in his closet and because the prints were not "etched." (PCHT 589:2-15; see also
id' l 609:22-610:17, 612:21-613:21).
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232.

With respect to the new information that some of the previously

unidentified fingerprints had been matched to Mr. Hill, Kerchusky testified that, in his
opinion, Hill was the last person to touch the .264 rifle and scope and that it was Hill
who removed the scope. (pCHT 615:23-616:19). However, Kerchusky admitted on
cross-examination (as he did at trial) that he has no way of knowing when fingerprints
are placed on any given item. (Id., 627:15-17).
233.

At the evidentiary hearing before this court, Kerchusky found fault with

Pangburn because Pangburn did not ask him specifically whether the unknown
fingerprints were "fresh." Kerchusky testified that several of the prints were fresh, and
that he had spoken to Pangburn during the trial, requesting that Pangburn put him
back on the stand to discuss the freshness of the prints, but that Pangburn declined to
do so.
234.

It was implied, if not expressed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,

that Pangburn's examination and presentation of Kerchusky's testimony was
insufficient because Pangburn was inadequately prepared to present the expert, based
upon the original plan for Pangburn to handle just the lay witnesses.
235.

The court does not accept this proposition for two reasons: first, the

record of Pangburn's examination sets forth that he was prepared for the examination,
and that he discussed various hypotheticals that brought the pertinent issue (aging of
fingerprints) before the jury for Kerchusky to comment on. (E.g. TT:5071-5072); second,
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the record also establishes that Pangburn conducted the cross-examination of the state's
fingerprint expert, Ms. Walthall, on February 16, 2005, more than i:vvo weeks before
Kerchusky's examination on March 3,2005. (Id., 5044:15). Clearly the decision for
Pangburn to handle the fingerprint evidence was decided long before Kerchusky took
the stand in March.
236.

At trial Pangburn began his cross-examination of Ms. Walthall with

questions regarding "this idea about aging fingerprints," (IT 3058:11-12), and he
inquired further regarding the defense theory that fingerprints would dissipate after
approximately one year. (Id., 3060:7-3062:11).
. 237.

The court concludes from the nature and extent of Pangburn's cross-

examination that he was well-aware of the defense theory regarding aging/freshness of
fingerprints by February 2005. Thus, Pangburn's examination of Kerchusky was not a
last-minute, shoot-from-the-hip situation, but it was, in accord with PangbUrn's
testimony, to get him involved some in the scientific aspect of the case and to take some
of the load off Rader.
238.

The court therefore concludes that the defense, through Pangburn, had a

definite strategy regarding the fingerprints; that Pangburn was aware of this strategy
well-ahead of his examination of Kerchusky and that he, as a matter of strategy, asked
the questions he chose to ask of Kerchusky without asking about "freshness" per se.
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Pangburn was prepared regarding the defense fingerprint theory, and he

exercised his judgment and skill in presenting those issues to the jury. He also argued
the freshness of the fingerprints to the jury in his closing. (See Supplemental Appeal
Transcript, 270:11-272:25) ("You know, these things start getting a year old, and you're
just not going to see it.... Those fingerprints had not been there for very long.").
240.

Mel Speegle, (Speegle) was the tenant in the guesthouse at the time of the

murders. He is also the owner of the .264 rifle used to murder the Johnsons.
241.

Speegle testified at trial that: (1) he kept the rifle in his closet along with

three other guns (IT 2702:8-2703:2); (2) the guns were not locked (id., 2703:3-8); (3) he
saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the scope was still on the
.264 rifle (id., p.2704:6-2706:8); (4) he had only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior
(id., 2706:17-21); (5) he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (id., 2708:2-9); and (6) he has no idea how

many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a friend helped him move into the
guesthouse (id., 2707:11-22).
242.

Speegle also testified that Johnson had access to his apartment, that

Johnson knew he would be gone the weekend before the murders, and that the .264
rifle, as well as his other guns and ammunition, were in the closet when Johnson
cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. (IT 2693:17-20,2694:25-2696:6,
2715:12-25).
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Speegle and Hill also both testified at the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing before this court. Speegle testified that he moved into the guest house on the
Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (PCHT 699:10-15).
244.

Hill helped Speegle move from his "ranch house" into the Johnson guest

house. (Id., 700:18-20, 703:20-23). Hill was a "good mend" of Speegle's and had been a
caretaker at Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Speelge's .264 rifle. (Id.,
p.704:1-4, 11-13, 724:10-20). To Speegle's knowledge, Hill did not have access to the
Johnson guest house. (Id., 704:8-10).
245.

Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Speegle's ranch and that he

helped Speegle move "a few things" into the Johnson guest house. (PCHT 726:14-17,
727:5-12). Hill also confirmed that he did not have access to the guest house. (Id.,
727:13-16).
246.

Hill specifically, and credibly, denied any involvement in the murders of

Alan and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the murders until about one week
after they occurred because he had been camping. (Id., 728:5-20).
247.

In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other than having

possibly left them when he helped Speegle move, Hill testified that, during the
springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Speegle's ranch, he "took [the rifle] out,
tried to sight it," and shot it "six or seven times" using Speegle's ammunition. (PCHT
728:21-729:7; see also 729:24-731:21).
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

To the extent that any Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of

Law, they are incorporated into these Conclusions of Law.
2.

An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-

Conviction Procedure Act initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. Kelly v. State,
_

Idaho - - - - J 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). Like the plaintiff in any other civil

proceeding, Johnson must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon
which her request for post-conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; see also id.
3.

A preponderance of the evidence requires evidence establishing a fact as

more probable than not. Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611,622, 80? P.2d 472,
483 (1991); Ebert v. Neu1ton, 97 Idono 418, 546 P.2d 64 (1976); see also Big Butte Ranch Inc.

v. Gmsmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9, 415 P.2d 48, 51 (1966) (IlfPreponderance of evidence' means
such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and
from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein.").
4.

As the Court in Big Butte Ranch noted further:
In the event that the evidence is evenly balanced so that the

court is unable to say that the evidence on either side of an
issue ... has the greater convincing force, then the court's
finding upon that issue must be against the party who had
the burden of proving it.

ld.
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5.

i

:

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought

underthe post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d
1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992).
6.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Johnson must

show that her attorney's performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984);

Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct.App.1995).
7.

To establish a deficiency, Johnson has the burden of showing that her

attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v.

State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).
8.

There is a strong presumption that trial counse1's performance falls within

the wide range of "professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176
(1988).
9.

"In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance," the Idaho

Supreme Court has cautioned, "judicial scrutiny must be highly deferential and every
effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time.'

II

State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 127 P.3d 954,
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961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323,329 (1999) and

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984»).
10.

Moreover, Idaho's appellate courts have long adhered to the proposition

that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL
4483675,7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,
263 (Ct.App.1994».
11.

In addition, Johnson must not only show incompetence, but must also

show that the deficient conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the proceeding cannot be relied upon as having produced a just
result. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
12.

Thus, Johnson's burden here is a "heavy" one. See Davis v. State, 116

Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). As was noted recently by the
United States Supreme Court:
Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task. ...
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to
escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not
presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be
applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial
inquiry" threaten the integrity of the very adversary process
the right to counsel is meant to serve ....
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Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S.

---J ---J

131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quoting Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. ~ ~ 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)) (citations omitted).
13.

In the end, the "question is whether an attorney's representation

amounted to incompetence under 'prevailing professional norms,'" not whether it
deviated from best practices or most common custom. Hatrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
14.

Johnson maintains seven claims for relief. Each will be discussed in tum.

I.

Johnson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden To Establish Ineffective

Assistance Of Counsel.

A.

Johnson was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel for her attorneys'

failing to request a continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine the state's expert, after
learning the comforter had not been collected as evidence.
15.

Johnson has presented limited post-hearing argument regarding this

claim; however, there was some testimony during the evidentiary hearing regarding

this issue, which therefore merits consideration by the court.
16.

The court concludes that there is very little evidence establishing: 1) the

claim that a continuance should have been requested; 2) Judge Wood would have

granted the request; 3) what should have been done with the extra time if the
continuance would have been granted; and 4) what, if any, legal arguments or expert
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testimony could have been elicited to establish a defense or create a better presentation
by the defense attorneys during the trial.
17.

In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of

counsel, Johnson is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
counsels' performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 V .S. 668, 687-88 (1984). "Because of the distorting effects of
hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a
strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-

90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).
18.

It was Johnson's burden to present evidence to this court sufficient to

overcome the strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" in
order to establish that counsels' performance was outside the wide range of
II

professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F .3d 1373, 1377 (9th
Cir.1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 V.S. at 690).
19.

Because "[s]trategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or

serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel," it was also Johnson's burden to prove that counsels' decisions were the result
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of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings
capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373. 941 P.2d 337, 344345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Gabourie v. State,
125 Idaho 254, 258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1994)).
20.

In order to prove prejudice, Johnson is required to show that counsels'

deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on her defense; i.e., but for
counsels' deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the
trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho
681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
21.

Regarding the second element, Johnson had the burden of showing that

her trial counsels' deficient conduct" so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80,844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
22.

When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's
inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713,
905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995).
23.

As with other decisions made by counsel, Johnson must overcome the

presumption that the decision not to file a particular motion was strategic or tactical.
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See State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) (trial counsel's choice
of witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his lack of objection to
testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions).
24.

In the underlying trial, one of the defense strategies was to attack the

state's improper handling of evidence and sloppy investigation. (See TT:4605:5-8
(I/[We're] going to show you where the state, first of all, ... police agencies in this case
did a very poor job of hanging onto the evidence; of even acquiring it, to begin with.")).
25.

Thus, this court will not now second-guess that strategy and find that the

defense should have had another strategy.
26.

Moreover, this court cannot conclude that a request for continuance on

such vague grounds would have been granted by Judge Wood, much less that the
continuance would have made a difference in the evidence presented or the approach
taken at trial.
27.

It was objectively reasonable for counsel to do precisely what they did in

this case - attack the state's failure to collect the comforter, along with other items of
evidence the state failed to collect from the crime scene, rather than request a
continuance on some vague, unsubstantiated basis.
28.

Therefore, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that

her counsel were deficient in failing to request a continuance, and moreover, that she
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suffered any prejudice as a result of the failure to request such a continuance.
Accordingly, Johnson is not e~titled to relief on this claim and it is DENIED.

B.

Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the scientific

basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on blood splatter opinion evidence.
29.

This allegation is factually disproved by the record in this case. As this

court has found based on the facts presented, the defense attempted, although
unsuccessfully, to create an experiment sufficiently similar to the explosion of a human
head to be admissible at trial. No facts support the claim that counsel was unprepared
or unschooled as to the legal standards applicable for the admission of this evidence.
There was no proof at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, through expert
testimony or otherwise, that there is some standard of law that Rader failed to recognize
which otherwise would help to get an inadequate re-creation/experiment admitted.
30.

Moreover, nothing has been shown which establishes that an experiment

better than the myriad of experiments tried by the defense even exists. In particular,
this court has not been shown that an experiment has been conducted that: 1) would be
admissible; and 2) Rader had access to, or should have known about during his
preparation for and conduct of the forensic issues in the trial in 2004 and 2005.
31.

During the trial, before the defense case-in-chief, Judge Wood conducted

an extensive hearing on the state's motion to exclude the experiment conducted by the
defense seeking to replicate the blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane
Johnson was shot in the head. (IT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503).
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32.

Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic

pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between
the media used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508).
33.

Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-

replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment," he would "take another look at it."
(TT 4509:17-22).
34.

Thus, the trial record belies Johnson's claims that her attorneys were

"unable to consult with any experts." (petition, p. 8, 115.c.). Counsel had adequate time
to consult with experts, and in fact did so, conducting a myriad of experiments with an
array of media from Styrofoam filled with pudding to the coconut that was argued
extensively before Judge Wood.
35.

Tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed

unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL
4483675,7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,
263 (Ct.App.1994)).
36.

There has been no showing here that defense counsel's efforts regarding

the experiments were anything but strategic, or that they were based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or any other shortcoming that can be
objectively evaluated.
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(

Rader's belief that he could have and should have reached out to other

professional groups or attorneys for assistance is simply second guessing and is
precisely the sort of hindsight that is insufficient for establishing a claim of deficient
performance.
38.

Johnson also fails to establish any prejudice regarding this claim, in that

the defense attorneys' theme throughout the case centered on the "no blood, no guilt"
theory and counsel presented forensic evidence for the jury's consideration, albeit short
of the coconut experiment, to establish their theory.
39.

Simply because the jury failed to accept the defense "no blood, no guilt"

premise is insufficient to establish that the attorneys were at fault in any way regarding
their efforts as to the science surrounding the blood spatter and their theory of the case.
40.

Therefore Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing defective

performance or prejudice regarding this claim and it is DENIED.
C.
41.

Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately c7'Oss-examine witnesses.
In claim 4(e), Johnson alleges that counsel were ineffective with respect to

the cross-examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Ellison, Walt Femling, Steve
Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez,
Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, ~ 16.)
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42.

Of these fourteen witnesses, only seven were called as witnesses at the

evidentiary hearing before this court: Walt Femling, Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos,
Consuelo Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (PCHT 2-3.)
43.

Johnson failed to call Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Ellison, Glenda

Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala and failed to present any evidence
as to counsels' decisions regarding their examination of these witnesses, or any
substantive evidence of how their testimony would have been different. Johnson,
therefore, failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was ineffective in crossexamining these witnesses. The court will discuss the remaining witnesses in turn.
44.

At the outset it is axiomatic that cross-examination of witnesses is

generally a tactical decision. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,563, n.2, 199 P.3d 123, 138 n.2
(2008). Judicial scrutiny of these issues "must be highly deferential and every effort
must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time.' " State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 127 P.3d 954,
961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999) and

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2065 (1984».
a. Sheriff Walt Femling.
45.

In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "failed to adequately cross-

examine the Blaine County Sheriff," Walt Femling who allegedly "made a statement
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during the early stages of the investigation to the effect that it was vital that police find
a suspect in order to prevent a negative perception of the Sun Valley area from
outsiders who may have decided not to visit if the crime went unsolved." (petition,
pp.10-11, ~ 16.a.iii.).
46.

The legal standard applicable to cross-examination provides that the

scope of Rader's cross-examination is entitled to the presumption that it was sound trial
strategy.
47.

Johnson has failed to rebut that presumption. Indeed, Johnson failed to

even inquire of Rader regarding his strategic decisions regarding Femling's testimony,
much less prove that the strategy was objectively unreasonable.
48.

The facts simply do not support Johnson's claim that law enforcement

were so dead-set on convicting Johnson that they went after her to the exclusion of all
others.
49.

As noted above, Femling testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law

enforcement interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports,
spent $517,000 investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5
people to the case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative
leads. (TT 2458:4-2461:16). It also took an extended period of time, and the receipt of
DNA evidence before the focus of the state's investigation narrowed to Sarah Johnson.
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50.

Given the similarities between Femling's trial testimony regarding the

scope of the investigation into the Johnson murders and his testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, this court finds that such testimony is credible.
51.

Thus, Johnson has failed to prove that counsel was deficient in cross-

examining Femling regarding a theory that the facts simply do not support. Moreover,
there is no showing that Johnson was prejudiced as a result of the allegedly inadequate
cross-examination.
52.

Accordingly, Johnson's claim as to the cross-examination of Femling is

DENIED.

b. Steve Harkins.
53.

The court concludes that Pangburn's cross-examination was, again, based

upon tactical decision-making and is not subject to second-guessing by this court.
54.

Pangburn did cross-examine Harkins' extensively regarding his

interviews in the case with Santos' known associates, and Pangburn succeeded in
asking about unsavory characters and Santos' drug-dealing mindset--even going so far
as to ask whether Santos' associates would kill for him.
55.

While not every question was asked of Harkins that Johnson would now,

in hindsight, think should have been asked, Johnson has failed to overcome the heavy
burden that such questions and the scope of such examination are matters of trial tactics
which are presumed to be sound trial strategy.
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56.

Johnson has also, given the scope and extent of the questions that were

asked, failed to establish the requisite prejudice here, that but for any errors by
Pangburn in his cross-examination of Harkins, the result would have been different.
57.

As such, Johnson has failed to overcome this presumption as to the cross-

examination of Detective Harkins. This claim is DENIED.
c.
58.

Bruno Santos.

This court has reviewed the record of the underlying trial and made

factual findings regarding the cross-examination of Santos by Rader.
59.

Those findings set forth that Rader was very knowledgeable of Santos'

shortcomings, and had a plan regarding the scope of his inquiry.
60.

His inquiry was largely cut short based on Judge Wood's evidentiary

ruling regarding the propriety of the defense's intended questions. Based thereon,
Rader indicated at the conclusion of the state's direct examination that the defense
"decided not to enter into a stipulation and ... decided not to cross examine Mr. Santos
... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15).
61.

This was a penultimate strategic decision made with knowledge of Santos'

past, with full knowledge of the lack of facts tying Santos to the Johnson murders, and
with an understanding of the legal ruling made by Judge Wood.
62.

Thus, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of proving that Rader's

decision not to cross-examine Santos was anything but strategic or that the decision was
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objectively unreasonable in light of the testimony Santos offered on direct and the
limitations Judge Wood placed on cross-examination.
63.

Johnson likewise has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the

failure to cross-examine Santos. Santos provided no additional testimony at the
evidentiary hearing that would have aided in Johnson's defense and there is no reason
to conclude that cross-examination of Santos at trial would have resulted in a different
outcome in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Johnson and the
complete absence of any evidence implicating Santos in the murders.
64.

Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief

on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Santos and this
claim is DENIED.

d. Consuela Cedeno.
65.

1his court has indicated that Ms. Cedeno's testimony at the post-

conviction evidentiary hearing was essentially valueless.
66.

The court has concluded as a finding of fact that it cannot conclude that

Pangburn simply passed off the cross-examination of this witness to Rader at the last
minute.
67.

The presumption therefore remains that the failure to cross-examine

Cedeno was a strategic decision and Johnson has not overcome the presumption in that
regard.
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68.

Moreover, even if the decision was inept and fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, this court cannot find prejudice regarding the issues which
Johnson now contends should have been asked on cross-examination.
69.

The court has concluded that Dunn's information regarding their being no

dew on the morning of September 3 is an unsupported fact, based upon the testimony
of Officer Cornelas. See supra, £n. 8. Moreover, the fact that Santos may have "run
around," or that Cedeno may have told differing stories regarding the odometer on the
family car is, in light of the entire record and the overwhelming evidence against
Johnson, inconsequential. 'These facts simply would not have made a difference in this
case, and there is no prejudice to Johnson based on counsel's failure to inquire about
them.
70.

Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief

on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Cedeno and this
claim is DENIED.

e. lane Lopez.
71.

This court has reviewed the entirety of the record as it pertains to the

issues raised as to the cross-examination of Jane Lopez. 'The court has further
concluded that the phone records which purportedly create a discrepancy actually do
not.
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72.

Therefore, the presumption that Rader's questioning, limited though it

was, was simply strategic has not been overcome in this case.
73.

Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's decision

regarding the cross-examination of Ms. Lopez was anything but strategic, much less
that it was deficient, and she has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Rader's
failure to try and impeach Ms. Lopez with the phone records. Indeed, Johnson did not
even attempt to do so at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
74.

Consequently, Johnson cannot demonstrate how any such impeachment

would have made a difference in the outcome of this case, particularly where the court
has made a factual determination that the records do not impeach Lopez.
75.

Because Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was

ineffective in his cross-examination of Ms. Lopez, this claim is hereby DENIED.
f. Raul Ornelas.

76.

The court has made factual findings that establish: 1) that Tim Richards

never testified to having walked in the back yard at the Johnson home before officers
arrived at the scene; and 2) Officer Raul Ornelas did not testify that the footprints were
made by more than one person; rather, he specifically testified that he could not tell.
77.

Pangburn's cross-examination of Ornelas was thus based upon the record

and the scope of Ornelas' direct testimony. Johnson has failed to prove Pangburn's
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efforts were either deficient or prejudicial for his failure to "point out" or "highlight"
information that was not actually in evidence.
78.

Moreover, Johnson failed to offer any evidence, let alone prove that

Pangburn's cross-examination of Officer Ornelas was anything but tactical. Johnson's
claim regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas is therefore DENIED.
G. Stuart Robinson.

79.

The court has made factual findings establishing that Stuart Robinson's

testimony before the grand jury was not inaccurate at the time it was made; the
fingerprints, though recovered at that time, were not identified.
80.

Thus, Rader's failure to impeach Robinson with that information is a non-

issue. There was no impeachment to be had regarding that statement.
81.

Even if there is some limited value from information Johnson elicited from

Robinson at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, that value comes nowhere close to
establishing Johnson's burden to show that "but for counsels' deficient performance,
there [is J a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App.
1999).
82.

Thus, this court concludes that Johnson has established neither deficient

performance nor prejudice regarding the cross-examination of Stuart Robinson. This
portion of Johnson's claim is therefore DENIED.
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D. Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to present evidence of an audio recording,
recorded inadvertently by Trooper Ross Kirtley.

83.

In this claim Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present

evidence of an audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on
Johnson "to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because Uohnson]
was the easiest target." (Petition, p.13, 'If 16.c.).
84.

The recording to which Johnson refers was a recording from Trooper

Kirtley's microphone and dashboard camera, which recorded from before he was
dispatched to the crime scene to approximately two and one-half hours later, when he
was still at the scene. (Exhibit 12).
85.

Given the entirety of the record herein, and the court's factual findings

regarding the lack of a "focus" on Johnson to the exclusion of others, see Findings of
Fact,

'If'lf 126-134, this court concludes that counsel were not ineffective for failing to

admit the recording.
86.

The officers' initial thoughts, while of some interest9, do nothing to

undermine the record of the police investigation, which shows that there were initially
multiple suspects, and that, in the eyes of Sheriff Femling, Johnson's status as "prime
suspect" did not materialize until the DNA results were returned showing Johnson's
DNA in the glove hidden in her pink robe in the garbage can.
9 One of the initiaJ thoughts of the officers on the recording was that a murder-suicide had occurred, a theory which
is unsupported by the evidence and which the defense did not pursue at trial.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 81

(

87.

(I,

Johnson failed to establish that the decision not to introduce such

evidence was objectively unreasonable or that introduction of such evidence, assuming
it could even be correctly characterized as Johnson has characterized it, would remotely
undermine confidence in the outcome of her case.
88.

Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel was

ineffective for failing to introduce the entirety of Trooper Kirtley's audio, the court
DENIES Johnson relief on this claim.

E.

Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to inquire whether certain

previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh."
89.

As the court has concluded based on the record in this case, Pangburn was

adequately prepared regarding the forensic/fingerprint testimony in the Johnson trial.
He inquired of the state's expert regarding aging of fingerprints, and he inquired
similarly of Mr. Kerchusky regarding the same issues.
90.

The information regarding the freshness of the prints was before the jury

from both Pangburn's direct examination of Kerchusky, and from his cross-examination
of Ms. Walthall. Moreover, Pangburn in fact argued that when the fingerprints start
/I

getting a year old ... you're just not going to see [them]." He also argued that the
unknown fingerprints, which have now been identified as those of Christopher Hill
"had not been there for very long." (Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25).
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91.

Thus, Pangburn did not err in failing to specifically ask whether the prints

were "fresh" or in failing to ask Kerchusky those questions which Kerchuskyanswered
at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing regarding who, in his opinion, touched the
scope last.
92.

The court therefore concludes that Pangburn's questions of Kerchusky at

trial do not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court further
concludes that Johnson has not overcome the "strong presumption that trial counsel's
performance falls within the wide range of 'professional assistance.'" Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988).
93.

1his court further recognizes that its scrutiny must be "highly deferential

and every effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.'" State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46,
127 P.3d 954, 961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,
329 (1999) and Strickland v. Washington, 46.6 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)).
94.

Viewing this issue from this deferential perspective, the court concludes

that Johnson has failed to establish that Pangburn was ineffective or that she has
suffered any prejudice from the claimed deficiengr. This claim is accordingly DENIED.
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F.

Johnson did not receive a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict due to the

cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of
the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings.
95.

Johnson maintains that she is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon

the cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the
facts and law of the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings.
96,

As is set forth above, this court has concluded that none of these

assertions, either individually or collectively, has been proven in this case. Nothing in
the record establishes that the defense team, or any of them, was chronically late,
unprepared or indolent,
97.

The facts have been established that Pangburn and Rader's conduct did

not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as to any of Jqhnson's claims,"
Consequently, she has failed to establish the cumulative error she alleges occurred in
this case.
98.

Johnson has not cited any support in the record that the defense team was

unaware of legal precedent or the law of the case. In fact, this court has found just the
opposite is true, particularly as it pertains to the defense attempts to: 1) admit their
blood spatter experiment; and 2) cross-examine Bruno Santos extensively regarding his
history.
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99.

(i,

Therefore, the court DENIES Johnson any relief based upon the

accumulation of alleged wrongful conduct by her attorneys.
II.

Johnson Is Not Entitled To A New Trial On The Basis Of Newly Discovered

Evidence.
100.

Johnson seeks a new trial in this matter on the basis of newly discovered

evidence relating to the recent identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of
the previously unidentified latent prints.
101.

Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if Johnson

demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to her at the time
of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191
P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976».
102.

In announcing this four-part test in Drapeau, the Court cited Professor

Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment,
"after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper
reluctance to give him a second trial." 97 Idaho at 691,551 P.2d at 978 (citation
omitted).
103.

A long line of Idaho cases have held, consistently with the Court's

pronouncement in Drapeau, that evidence known to the defendant at the time of trial
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cannot be considered newly discovered. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191
P.3d at 224 (in order to be newly discovered evidence, the evidence itself, not just
importance or materiality of that evidence, must be unknown and unavailable prior to
trial); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404,410,273 P.2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which
defendant was aware of prior to trial but chose not to present is not newly discovered);

State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99,11 P.2d 619,622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial
is not newly discovered); State v. Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts
unknown at time of trial could be considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho
45,88 P. 240, 242 (1907) (concluding evidence that colts were not stolen but actually
belonged to the rancher for which defendants worked was not newly discovered).
104.

In this case the only thing about the "newly discovered evidence" which is

new is the identification to whom the fingerprints belong. Nevertheless, the court
concludes that this identification meets the first prong of Drapeau because the evidence
is newly discovered and was unknown to Johnson at the time of trial.
105.

The court also finds that the fourth Drapeau prong is met; the discovery of

the identity of the unlcnown fingerprints had nothing to do with the defendant's
conduct.
106.

However, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the

discovery that Mr. Hill's fingerprints on the .264 rifle, scope, and ammunition boxes is
material or would likely produce an acquittal on a retrial.
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107.

()

At trial, the evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the scope, the

box and elsewhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (IT 2994:10-3077:25;
5045:15-5132:15; 5808:1-5843:4; 5846:16-5858:17).
108.

The jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were on the scope, gun,

some of the shells, and the box containing the shells. (TT 3077:1-17). Thus, it was
established at trial that Johnson had left no fingerprints on those items; if any of the
prints on those items belonged to the "real killer," then the killer was not Johnson and
was some unidentified person.
109.

Pangburn utilized this fingerprint information and argued it to the jury, to

no avail. (See, e.g., Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25) (pangburn's closing
argument that the fingerprints on the rifle and scope had not been there very long implying that the "real killer" was unidentified).
110.

The jury was aware of the phantom prints, and they still convicted

Johnson of both counts of first degree murder; thus, telling a new jury the name of the
owner of those phantom prints will not likely produce an acquittal.
111.

Speegle and Hill both testified as to how, when and where Hill had

touched the rifle. The fact that this information is now known makes the fingerprint
testimony even less valuable than it was at the time of the trial, when the defense could
argue that a nameless third party handled the gun, the shells and removed the scope.
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112.

)

The court recognizes that Mr. Kerchusky testified in a contradictory

manner to this conclusion; h~ is convinced of his theory of the case, as much as the
state's expert, Ms. Walthall is convinced that you cannot age fingerprints.
113.

This court's task is to evaluate both witnesses' testimony in light of the

entire record before the court. In doing so, the court chooses not to accept Kerchusky's
hypothesis.
114.

This court, as fact-finder, is not bound to accept the testimony of any

expert witness. See Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 566, 130 P.3d 1097,
1104 (2006) (the factfinder is free to determine the weight to be given to the testimony of
an expert); In re Baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 460, 902 P.2d 477,485 (1995) (the weight to
be given to expert testimony is for the trier of fact).
115.

The court simply cannot accept the theory that Hill was the unknown

killer in this case. Hill testified credibly that he was camping on East Magic Road at the
time of the murders. He had no access to the guest house or to the Johnson home; he
has no knowledge of the inner workings of the Johnson home, i.e., where knives were
hidden, where Sarah's robe was kept, or where the key to the gun safe was located (to
retrieve the 9mm magazine). The totality of the circumstances simply does not support
Kerchusky's theory that Hill was the last person to touch the scope, the gun, or the
ammunition and this court does not accept that theory.
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116.

The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson's fingerprints were

not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the ammunition or packaging, given that a
leather glove was found in her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was
wrapped in Johnson's robe ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove containing
Johnson's DNA.
117.

Moreover, the trial jury was also instructed on the theory of aiding and

abetting murder. Use of such instruction was affirmed on appeal. See State v. Johnson,
145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008).
118.

While the state did not rely upon that "theory of liability" in proving its

case, see 145 Idaho at 975, 188 P.3d at 917, the jury was free to consider that theory
because "it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been the actual shooter."
ld. at 977, 188 P.3d at 919.

119.

Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction evidentiary

hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not the actual shooter, was not
complicit as an aider and abettor.
120.

It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the murders. There

was no forced entry in this case, either to the Johnson home or the guesthouse;

JOMSon' s bedroom contained .264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a righthanded leather glove matching the left one wrapped in JoMson' s robe in the garbage;
both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the family vehicle; the knives found in
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the guest bedroom and at the foot of the Johnsons' bed were located where an intruder
or stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to the guesthouse;
Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her relationship with
Santos; and Johnson gave numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was
doing when her parents were shot. As Judge Barry Wood viewed this evidence:
I think it's really interesting that the brother-in-law, the
man who had gotten married there the week before, two
weeks before, whatever it was, that spent, he testified, four
or five days in that very upstairs apartment in the guest
house, and never knew the gun was there, never saw it.
Used the closet and didn't even know the gun was there.
Didn't know the bullets were there.
[TJo suggest to a reasonable jury such things that
somebody off of the street could come and find that gun in
the guest house, find those bullets in the guest house, know
when the parents were going to be there; find the knives in
the kitchen that are hidden, the one knife that's hidden
behind the microwave or bread box, whatever it was, in the
dark, no less; go out past the family dog that the evidence
was would bark, and the dog didn't bark. Take the same
route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took out of the
house, past the trash can where the robe is found. Get her
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not
awaken her or bother her.
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the
parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do all of this
in the dark and not disturb the parents just defies common
sense.
I think a reasonabie jury could clearly find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here.
(Supp. Appeal Transcript, 449:1-450:4).
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121.
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'TIris court agrees with this sentiment, to the extent that Johnson must

show that the alleged "newly discovered evidence" would produce an acquittal in
another trial, and this court simply cannot make that leap given the above-noted facts.
122.

'TIris court's reference to the aiding and abetting theory is not to say that

this court is unconvinced of Johnson's direct culpability for the murder of her parents,
as argued by the state at trial. Add to the above-noted circumstances the DNA
evidence, Johnson's motive for the crimes, her access and her opportunity, and this
court concludes that telling a new jury that the fingerprint owner is now identified will
do nothing to ameliorate the mountain of evidence which the jury saw and heard in this
case against Ms. Johnson.
123.

To quote Judge Wood again:
The jury heard all of the evidence about the robe. The
jury doesn't have to believe that the crime occurred exactly
the way the defense theory is that it occurred. The argument
of no blood, no guilt; well, the converse of that is if there's
blood, there is guilt. And there's blood. There's blood all
over the robe, blood on the socks.
Your whole theory, it seems to me, the whole defense
theory is an aiding and abetting theory, because the
defendant's there and there's no evidence that excludes the
defendant. There's not one piece of evidence that excludes
the defendant from the commission of this crime that I
heard. She's right there. And her defense -- I mean her
defense people, Howard and Mink, testify -- and Inman, I
believe, all three - at least two of them testified that the
doors were open. The door to the parents' bedroom, which
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is propped open by the pillows, and the door to Sarah
Johnson's room is open.
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was
taken out of the Suburban, that's something else that this
unnamed killer would have had to have known, is where the
gloves were located, the mother's gloves in the Suburban.
Located those in the dark, as well, and brought them into the
house to help commit this crime. And leave one in Sarah
Johnson's room with two cartridges for the .264; unspent,
unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson's room that part of her
mother's body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah
Johnson's room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it
just doesn't make sense to me.
And I don't think it would make sense to the jury. One of
the leather gloves found in her room, the other one found
out -- wrapped up in the trash can inside the pink robe.
That's what I mean by the circumstantial evidence here, and
she admits being there.
The evidence here is overwhelming.
(Id., 450:4-451:19).

124.

This court adopts Judge Wood's reasoning as its own. The court has spent

significant hours reviewing the 1000's of pages of transcripts from trial; the court has
listened to testimony during the post-conviction hearing; the court has reviewed the
parties' post-hearing briefing; and the court has reviewed all of this evidence against
the legal standards set forth herein. The evidence against Ms. Johnson which exists in
this record is, indeed, "overwhelming."
125.

Thus, the court concludes that the evidence identifying Mr. Hill's

fingerprints is insufficient to make such evidence material, or likely to produce an
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 92

(

(

acquittal. As such, Johnson's claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
is DENIED.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court
hereby concludes that Johnson's Petition for Post-Conviction relief is, in all respects,
DENIED. Counsel for the state is to prepare a judgment in conformity with this opinion

within seven days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/ ' G. RICHARD BEVAN
District Judge
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